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This thesis identifies four major problems facing the Altemative Dispute Resolution
profession-especially domestic mediation-and proposes constructive solutions using
ADR pioneer and feminist-pragmatist philosopher Mary Parker Follett's work. I argue
these problems are grounded in a conception of persons as independent and radically
autonomous, rather than interdependent and embedded in social communities. Mediators
often justify professional expansion by claiming mediation is more empowering than other
ADR methods. However, absent a well-developed theory of interdependence, mediation
perpetuates the power of negative socioeconomic forces over clients, furthering oppression
not empowerment. Central to Follett's theory is a conception of power consistent with the
idea that persons are interdependent. Effective domestic mediation reform could be
achieved using Follett's theory, which demonstrates how ostensibly individual matters
leading to "private" conflicts are inseparable from social circumstances and public
concerns. I conclude with several solutions based on this alternative conception that help
rectify current ADR problems.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: SITUATING MY CRITIQUE OF
DOMESTIC MEDIATION PRACTICES
Despite the growth of programs and applications, alternative dispute resolution
(ADR)-and in particular, mediation-as currently practiced in the United States is
facing major challenges, and may even be in the midst of a "crisis."] This feminist
philosophical critique aims to delineate key causes and aspects of those challenges, and
propose avenues which may lead to constructive solutions, building upon a reclamation
of the work of ADR pioneer and feminist-pragmatist philosopher Mary Parker Follett. I
locate the crux of the problem in the tension that arises from the contradiction between
the mediation profession's widespread aim of empowerment and the mistaken conception
of the individual persons who participate in mediation as radically autonomous-which
Follett denounces as a "fallacy" (1918, 61).
Mediation professionals in the US, and in particular those who practice domestic
mediation, are generally committed to the core value of empowering clients, and thus to
developing mediation practices that are empowering. These same practices are
nevertheless rooted in the individualist fallacy, which conceives of individuals as
radically autonomous rather than embedded in social communities, as will be explicated
2below.2 As dispute resolution educators and practitioners Deborah M. Kolb and Linda L.
Putnam point out, "Interdependence is clearly the sine qua non of negotiation. Parties
need each other to make agreements." Yet "[i]nterdependence, as it has been theorized
and applied in [ADR] practice, is based on an instrumental assumption" that "parties need
each other primarily to satisfy their individual interests. As a result of this individualistic
view, theory and research on how parties construct interdependence are underdeveloped
and typically treated as a residue of dependence" (2005, 142). This problem, as well as
the challenges that the mediation profession currently faces, is not limited to relations
between the individual parties who are participating directly in a mediation process.
Rather, as I will show, the interdependence between those parties and other members of
their community who are not directly participating-and between those parties and socio-
economic institutions and conditions-also has been neglected in mediation practice,
with detrimental consequences to the parties and to their communities. I want to be clear
at the outset that, while my claim that the notion of the radically autonomous individual is
mistaken and my claim regarding the reality of interdependence may prove to have
general validity, my purpose here is limited to defending the validity and efficacy of
those claims only as they apply in the ADR context.
Why A Feminist Philosophical Critique?
While a central task of this critique is reclaiming the work of early feminist-
pragmatist philosopher Mary Parker Follert, my project here is also directly informed by
more contemporary feminist theoretical critiques of alternative dispute resolution and
3mediation. Some significant changes in mediation practice already have been made as a
result. For instance, feminist scholarly work undertaken primarily in the 1980s and early
1990s, shortly after the US mediation profession's inception in the 1970s, underlays the
now widespread recognition within the profession of how mediation can amplify gender-
based power disparities between disputants. This theoretical work also spurred the
resulting practical measures that have been taken to avoid mediating unless those power
disparities can be addressed effectively, especially in cases that involve gender-based
violence (see e.g. Benjamin and Irving 1992, 133, 143-147 passim). For example, the
"Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation," developed by a
symposium of professionals ranging from experienced individual mediators to experts in
ADR law to nonprofit professional organizations, state that family mediators "shall
recognize a family situation involving domestic abuse and take appropriate steps to shape
the mediation process." Those steps include ensuring mediators are appropriately trained,
determining when mediation is not appropriate, and ensuring the safety and security of
the participants during mediation (SSP 2000, 8).
Feminist theorists were also among the first to raise concerns not just about power
disparities between individual disputants as such, but also about the fundamental
problems that are central to this feminist philosophical critique. These problems include
how assumptions about persons as radically autonomous individuals and the private
nature of contemporary mediation processes can magnify socially-based power
disparities between individual disputants, as well as put the burden on disputants for the
effects of social pressures beyond their individual control (see e.g. Thornton 1991, 456-
459 passim; Lichtenstein 20-21,25; see also Kolb and Putnam 2005, passim). A large part
of the work I undertake in this constructive critique falls squarely within this
contemporary feminist theoretical tradition.
Mediation at an Impasse
Because the practice of mediation relies on a mistaken individualistic concept of
persons rather than a well-developed theory of interdependence, despite the best
intentions of professional mediation practitioners the mediation process can replicate and
perpetuate the power of negative social forces between clients, and thus can unwittingly
serve as an agent of oppression rather than empowerment. A related and fundamental, but
less-recognized, concern-and a concern that is at the core ofthis project-is how the
conception of individuals as radically autonomous has led to current professional
practices that focus on the effort to help individuals find private solutions to problems,
even though often the roots of those problems are beyond what individuals can control
and lie outside their private purview. The mediation process can perpetuate the power of
oppressive social forces over clients as well as between them. Consequently, the
effectiveness of mediation in achieving the primary goal ofempowering clients remains
severely constrained. This has resulted in an impasse, in that as a profession mediators
justify its further expansion in large part on the claim that mediation is more empowering
for clients than other forms ofdispute resolution, yet the profession has never adequately
considered whether current mediation theory and practice can adequately sustain this
5claim. The mediation profession has the responsibility and opportunity to find effective
ways to resolve this impasse between our values and our current practices.
While both the nature of the challenges and their possible solutions that I address
arguably have bearing across the mediation profession, my particular concern is with
domestic mediation, since the constraints on empowering clients are magnified with
regard to domestic mediation cases due to our inheritance of social mores regarding the
separation of the "public sphere" of government and commerce from the more
constrained "private sphere" of family and household affairs (Luban 2004, 494-95).3 The
resulting set of problems can be addressed by reforming mediation practices and
particularly domestic mediation practices to incorporate the lessons from neglected
theoretical resources, such as Mary Parker Follett's work, that emphasize how ostensibly
individual problems that lead to "private" disputes are necessarily inseparable from social
circumstances and public concerns.
Overview of This Critique
In this introductory chapter, in addition to the presentation of the purpose and
scope of this critique, I address the importance of experience for linking theory with
practice in the context of mediation. I also provide an introduction to current mediation
practices, along with a clarification of the use of some ADR terminology. Chapter 2
explicates four key interrelated problems with mediation practice that contribute
significantly to the challenges that the mediation profession, and particularly domestic
mediation, is currently facing. Then I outline the social and legal conditions that
6contributed to how the mediation profession has developed, focusing on the unwitting
reliance on the mistaken idea that persons are radically autonomous individuals. I also
provide a working definition of what I call the "individualist fallacy." Chapter 3 is an in-
depth explication and analysis of Mary Parker Follett's work, focusing on her theory of
persons as interdependent and socially embedded, showing how that work is an
invaluable resource both for critiquing current mediation practices and as a theoretical
basis for rectifying the problems with those practices. In Chapter 4, I offer several
specific constructive solutions for reforming current mediation practices based on
Follett's alternative conception of persons as interdependent. My final conclusions are
presented in Chapter 5.
The Importance of Experience for Linking Theory With Practice
As a feminist philosopher who is also a practicing mediator, I am a strong
supporter of mediation as a practice that generally is preferable to other ways of resolving
disputes, such as through fiat (legal or otherwise) or threat of violence. I have
experienced first-hand how mediation can offer productive insights and creative solutions
for disputants who entered the process with little hope of either. However, I often also
have experienced the pressure of the challenges described above while working to assist
mediation clients, and my experiences as a mediator have inspired and informed this
critique with the aim of promoting constructive solutions to the challenges facing our
profession. So throughout this critique, I will illustrate my concerns and how possible
7solutions might emerge with case studies, including composites of cases based on my
experiences (omitting or altering any details that could compromise confidentiality).
Here is an initial example, informed in part by my experience, that helps clarify
some important aspects of the challenges the mediation profession currently faces that are
taken up in greater depth below. When married couples or domestic partners are forced
by economic circumstances to work evening or graveyard shifts-sometimes even
opposite shifts-to make ends meet, it is not surprising that the well-documented extra
stresses that come with shift work make it highly unlikely such relationships will succeed
over time.4 Although these types of stresses may be acknowledged in passing during
domestic mediation sessions (e.g., "we can't agree on how to raise our children and have
grown apart because there's no time to sit down together to talk"), the burden remains on
the disputing parties to resolve their differences in the context of privately reaching a
mutual decision about whether and how to stay together or split up. While excellent
facilitation by a mediator certainly can assist the individual parties qua individuals in
doing this as amicably as possible, there is no systematic way during the mediation
process to explicitly recognize and take into account the broader societal pressures that
have contributed to those differences.
In my experience, mediation agreements that come out of this private setting often
have the valuable effects of helping to alleviate the immediate intensity of the conflict
and produce agreement on some short-term remedies. However, those same agreements
tend not to endure over time because the mediation resources available to the individual
parties as they attempt to resolve their conflicts do not help them confront the broader
8societal roots of that conflict. For instance, it is not unusual for the same clients to return
to mediation after a few months or years because they experienced the initial mediation
process as providing some relief, yet their conflicts have resurfaced in largely the same
way.5 In short, the current practice of mediation is successful at treating some of the
symptoms of domestic conflict, but lacks the power to reliably help disputants address
major underlying causes. Yet, as Mary Parker Follett's work shows, being empowered to
confront those underlying problems is crucial for enabling clients to work together to
develop the creative solutions that in turn empower them to not only successfully move
on from current conflicts, but also to be better prepared to face new problems as they
arIse.
An Introduction to Current Mediation Practices
Alternative dispute resolution methods encompass a broad range of practices,
from binding arbitration (basically a private version of legal judging) to facilitation
(where the facilitator provides services that are limited to supporting discussion, but not
specifically problem-solving, between the parties). Mediation has become the most
prototypical ofthe ADR methods, which provide alternatives to the government-based
legal system (Fiadjoe 2004, 23; Coltri 2004, 313-14). Moreover, the largest and fastest
growing area of mediation in the US is the practice of "domestic mediation," also called
"family mediation." Domestic mediation provides services for people who are in disputes
related to conflicts that occur in the context of kinship and family relations, such as those
arising from divorces, child custody arrangements, elder care responsibilities, teen-parent
9interactions, or even from running family businesses. In this context, "kinship" and
"family" refer not only to domestic relations established by blood-ties, marriage and
formal adoption; they may also include relations established through formal or informal
guardianships, formal or informal domestic partnerships, other forms of co-habitation,
and even close friendships or partnerships absent co-habitation (Mayer 2004,66-67).6
Since the term "mediation" has evolved over the years and still is sometimes used
interchangeably with other ADR terms such as "arbitration" (Schwerin 1995, 15; Coltri
2004, 14,306-309), a working definition for the practice of mediation is important,
particularly as the term encompasses domestic mediation (see Taylor 2002,3, 104V
Dispute resolution professor and mediator Carrie Menkel-Meadow observes that
articulating any comprehensive definition of mediation is a necessary yet possibly futile
exercise, since as a human practice "mediation has become almost as variable as the other
human processes it was designed to replace or supplement." Consequently, definitions of
mediation practices "can be constructed and evaluated on many different dimensions,"
which "makes the creation of typologies complex" (2003b, 190, 180).8
Nevertheless, current practices within the profession of mediation in the United
States generally may be distinguished from other ADR practices, such as arbitration, by
the following five features (see Mayer 2004, 85, 105-108; Coltri 2004, 390, 350, 436,
256,318,538-545 passim; Kovach 2005,309-314 passim). Although some of these
features may be found to some extent in other ADR practices besides mediation (and a
few practitioners who claim to be mediating may at times omit or depart some of these
features), taken together these five features can serve to demarcate mediation practice.
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The first distinguishing feature is the commitment to providing a private and confidential
setting for the individual clients present at mediation proceedings. Unlike other dispute
resolution practices, such as arbitration, mediations in the United States are almost
always conducted in closed sessions limited only to the mediator(s) and those few parties
who are deemed to be most actively and directly involved in the conflict (such as
divorcing spouses in a child custody dispute). In addition, both those parties and the
mediator(s) pledge to keep the mediation proceedings confidential, and not to use
information that is learned solely through those proceedings in any other forum. A
common way these confidentiality requirements are explained to mediation clients is that
if information is revealed during mediation that would not be separately discoverable in
another way, the parties agree it will not be used outside the mediation process.
However, when a signed settlement agreement is reached, that agreement is considered a
legally enforceable contract.
The second feature that helps distinguish mediation from other ADR practices is
the ideal ofthe mediator maintaining impartiality or neutrality with regard to which of
the parties to the dispute is "right" and what possible outcome would be "best." A related
ideal of fair or equal consideration is widespread in all ADR methods, including
arbitration. However, at the point in an arbitration when the arbitrator may need to make
the final decision about how to resolve the dispute ifthe parties cannot agree, often the
arbitrator will rely explicitly on outside expertise, community standards, or legal
considerations as rationales for the final decision which determines the outcome of the
dispute and which party will prevail.
11
The third and related distinguishing feature is that mediators are not required to
consider legal precedents or follow legal procedures, unlike arbitrators in many
arbitration processes and unlike judges, lawyers, and juries in court proceedings.9 In
many states, mediators are statutorily required to report certain criminal activity that they
learn about during mediation, such as child abuse; however, these types of legal
requirements are separate from requirements to follow legal precedents or lack thereof.
The fourth distinguishing feature is the emphasis in mediation on the dispute
resolution process over substantive matters (but not to the exclusion of substance). For
example, although the importance of the goal of reaching a settlement agreement may
vary widely (from the highest to the lowest priority) depending on the method of
mediation, in all methods how conflicts are resolved generally is held to be more
important than what the dispute is about or the substantive content of any resulting
resolution. Indeed, mediators often hold that absent an effective process, reaching
agreement on the substantive issues is unlikely or even impossible.
The last distinguishing feature is prioritization in the mediation process of the
commitment to empower the parties to voluntarily create their own mutually acceptable
solutions for their dispute, rather than the mediator imposing or providing solutions for
them. While initial participation in mediation may be required, and that requirement may
be made public (e.g. by unsealed court order), decisions to continue with the mediation
process and agree with any possible solutions must necessarily be voluntary in order to
fall within the scope of mediation as commonly practiced in the United States (see Coltri
2004,313-14.)
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Of these five features that distinguish professional mediation practices in the US,
the most widespread-and also the most significant in both theory and practice-are the
insistence on upholding the values of voluntary participation of the parties and non-
coercive nature of the proceedings in order to empower the participants (Schwerin 1995,
9; Coltri 2004,318-319).10 For example, the 1994 version of "Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators," which have been widely adopted in the United States by
governmental entities, nonprofit mediation organizations, and private mediation
associations, states:
A mediator facilitates communications, promotes understanding, focuses the
parties on their interests, and seeks creative problem solving to enable the parties
to reach their own agreement. .. Self-determination is the fundamental principle of
mediation. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the
parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement. (ACR 2008a, under Preface, §
1; emphasis addedy 1
Very similar language has been used for the "Model Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation" (SSP 2000, 2).12 These values of voluntary participation of the
parties in a non-coercive process in order to empower the participants have particular
weight with regard to domestic mediation. As Lori S. Coltri points out in her ADR
textbook, many mediators use what she terms "pure mediation" or "facilitative
mediation." This kind of facilitative process, "whose goal is to promote [a] collaborative,
integrative, principled" approach that is "characterized by the mediator's efforts to
promote constructive negotiation by the disputants" is widespread in domestic mediation
(2004, 318, 603).
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ADR Terminology: Definitions and Clarifications
Before proceeding, the following clarifications regarding ADR terminology as
used in this critique are in order. First, I want to be very clear that the term "mediation"
as used here refers only to ADR methodes) where, at a minimum, the parties most
directly involved in a conflict are encouraged to work together to voluntarily try to reach
their own consensual solutions with a mediator who is committed to providing non-
coercive assistance. Mediation in this sense is not a process that involves a third
party-such as a judge or arbitrator-who has formal powers the other parties in the
mediation do not have (beyond facilitative power). On the contrary, while those whose
specific role it is to guide and support mediation efforts indeed can be influential, by
definition they do not have or exercise more power to promote or adopt solutions or
agreements than the other parties. Rather, in formal terms they explicitly do not hold such
power. The parties to a mediation, not the mediator, are the persons designated to gain
and retain the power to create and implement productive solutions.
Second, within the ADR field, the terms "profession" or "professional" generally
do not serve to distinguish between providing mediation services on a paid versus unpaid
basis. Instead, these terms indicate mediators who have had some training or experience
that allows them to meet certain minimum standards or follow certain guidelines of
practice, although there is considerable variation among the standards and guidelines (see
Coltri 2004,324). Many ofthe mediators who meet these minimum standards are
volunteers (see Schwerin 1995, 8-9). Likewise, the term "client" does not necessarily
imply that those who are provided or avail themselves of mediation services are
14
customers, in the sense that the purchase of mediation services becomes the main feature
of the relationship between mediators and clients. Mediation services are often provided
at little or no cost, or in settings where, although there may be some exchange of money
or other compensation provided for the mediators, the relationship of mediation clients to
the mediators is not primarily that of customers (ibid.). Finally, note that the terms
"clients," "disputants," "parties," and "participants" as used both here and in the dispute
resolution literature generally are interchangeable when they refer to the role of those
who take part in an ADR process with the assistance of a mediator or other ADR
practitioner.
15
Notes for Chapter I
1 "Crisis" is Bernard S. Mayer's term (2004; see title and passim).
2 A working definition of the mistaken notion of persons as radically autonomous-the
"individualist fallacy"-is provided in the Summary section of Chapter 2.
3 The traditional association of the public sphere with men and masculinity, and the private sphere
with women and femininity, has affected ADR practices as Margaret Thornton points out (1991,
448-49 and passim). David Luban notes that transactions between individuals (including
corporations as legally deemed to be persons) are sometimes located in a (quasi-)private sphere,
leaving the public sphere to politics and governmental institutions (2004, 494-95). However, as
Thornton explicates, in either case interactions and commerce outside the domestic realm are
associated with freedom (1991, 450-53). Thornton provides an extensive analysis of how this
"malleable" but persistent dichotomy between the masculine public sphere of freedom and the
constrained feminine private (domestic) sphere is reified in dispute resolution methods (see ibid.,
450-51,456-58). (Although most of Thornton's specific examples center on British and
Australian practices, they are relevant to ADR as practiced in the United States.)
4 The detrimental effects of shift work on domestic relations have long been recognized. Blanche
Grosswald summarizes and documents these effects in "Shift Work and Negative Work-to-
Family Spillover" (2003).
5 Mayer's analysis supports my experience: "Even if there are high rates of agreement and
satisfaction associated with collaborative processes [i.e. mediation], there is no clear evidence to
date that these result in better relationships over time, [or in] improved long-term cooperation and
adjustment (as in divorce) ... " (2004,59). However, this is not to deny that some clients do return
to mediation for assistance with domestic disputes that are substantially different from their
original concerns, rather than remaining mired in those original concerns.
6 For an in-depth explication of many of the various types of disputes domestic mediators address,
see "Part III: Specialized Practices in Family Mediation" in Alison Taylor's The Handbook of
Family Dispute Resolution (2002, 293-418).
7 Note that Mary Parker Follett often uses the terms "conciliation" and "mediation"
interchangeably, and with a similar meaning to the term "mediation" as used here, as contrasted
with other more coercive dispute resolution processes such as arbitration (see for example 1942f,
230, 231-238 passim). However, in current usage, "conciliation" is considered to be a "poorly
defined term, sometimes referring to mediation, other times to various [other] processes that
focus on relationship repair" (Coltri 2004, 597).
8 As Joseph A. Scimecca succinctly states, "The field of conflict resolution has been characterized
by a lack of clarity and definitions" (1993, 219n). E. Franklin Dukes's "Appendix: Tenninology"
(1996, 185-195) provides further information on the varied definitions (or lack thereof) for
alternative dispute resolution processes; the difficulties with and various approaches to defining
mediation are addressed at some length (190-193). Note that Dukes's proposed solution, to adopt
a definition of mediation that would encompass forms of alternative dispute resolution that
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include imposition of a settlement by a third party as a last resort (see 191), has been rejected by
most domestic mediation practitioners and by professional organizations whose specific focus is
mediation. For example, both the 1994 and revised 2005 Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators (discussed below) emphasize that mediation should be a voluntary and noncoercive
process (see ACR 2008a and 2008b).
9 It is worth noting that Lawrence Susskind discusses how a sort of informal precedent does apply
to mediation, in that the outcome of a mediation (whether formally settled or not) is known by the
mediators who wi]] then use that knowledge to inform their role in further mediations. In
addition, the outcome will inevitably become generally known by friends, family members,
colleagues and others who interact with the disputants (2004, 515). For example, ifthe schedule
when young children should stay with each parent is at issue, day care workers will be aware of
which parent drops off or picks up the children on which days, as well as whether the parents
and/or the children seem stressed by or satisfied with the situation. However, such informal
precedent does not create any specific legal responsibilities or requirements for mediators or
participants.
10 While much attention has been given within ADR research to the nature ofthe power mediators
do and should have in the mediation process, the value of empowering mediators is not as widely
attended to or shared within the mediation profession as that of empowering clients (Mayer 2004,
108-109; Schwerin 1995,26-27). However, some attention has been given by advocates ofthe
community mediation movement to the need to empower mediators within the mediation process.
This is in part because the community mediation model involves training volunteers who are part
of the communities to be served, and as such are presumed to need mediation to provide them
with a more positive experience than would necessarily be the case if significant monetary
compensation were involved (see Schwerin 1995,26-29 passim,125-131 passim).
11 The 1994 Model Standards were jointly developed and approved by the Society for
Professionals in Dispute Resolution (now the Association for Conflict Resolution), the American
Bar Association, and the American Arbitration Association. Both the Washington (State)
Mediation Association and the Oregon (State) Mediation Association have adopted these
standards in whole or in large part (see WMA 2008 and OMA 2008). A revised version ofthe
Model Standards was jointly developed and approved by all three organizations in 2005, but has
not yet been as widely adopted as the 1994 version. The 2005 Preamble that corresponds to the
1994 Preface and Section One excerpts quoted here has been revised to read, "Mediation serves
various purposes, including providing the opportunity for parties to define and clarify issues,
understand different perspectives, identify interests, explore and assess possible solutions, and
reach mutually satisfactory agreements, when desired...A mediator shall conduct a mediation
based on the principle of party self-determination [which] is the act of coming to a voluntary,
uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to process and
outcome" (ACR 2008b).
12 These standards for domestic mediation were adopted in 2000 after a two-year collaboration by
an ad-hoc Symposium on Standards of Practice (SSP), which included representatives from a
wide range of professional mediation organizations and domestic mediation service providers,
including the Academy of Family Mediators and the American Bar Association Family Section.
17
CHAPTER II
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CHALLENGES AND
HOW MEDIATION GOT TO THIS IMPASSE
The previous chapter introduced the purpose and scope of this critique, and
addressed the importance of experience for linking theory with practice in the context of
mediation. I also provided an introduction to current mediation practices, along with a
clarification of the use of some ADR terminology. In this chapter, I explicate four key
interrelated problems with mediation practice that contribute significantly to the
challenges the mediation profession, and particularly domestic mediation, currently is
facing. Each of these four key problems highlights the tension between the mediation
profession's core value of empowerment and particular aspects of mediation practice that
subvert realizing that value: 1) how mediation as currently practiced magnifies social
power disparities between disputants; 2) how the private and confidential nature of
mediation proceedings curtails access to information needed to identify and remedy
problems that have a community or social scope; 3) how individual disputants bear the
burden of domestic failures when both the causes of those failures and resources that
could help remedy those failures are outside the purview of the disputants; and 4) how
neither individual disputants nor mediators are accountable to other individuals who are
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affected by the dispute and its outcome. I also present an outline of the social and legal
conditions that contribute to how the mediation profession has developed, focusing on the
unwitting reliance on the mistaken idea that persons are radically autonomous
individuals.
Four Interrelated Problem Areas in Current Domestic Mediation Practices
As discussed above, alternative dispute resolution methods and mediation in
particular have proven successful judging by the growth in their use, and when evaluated
within the narrow confines of offering a private extralegal alternative! for dispute
resolution in response to limited viable public options provided by court systems and to
the decline of traditional communities. Yet beyond this narrow context, ADR methods in
general and domestic mediation practices in particular have limited appeal and
applicability, and thus are facing severe challenges, a situation that has been described as
an impasse or crisis. These challenges are due in significant part to several key
interrelated issues, each of which has been insufficiently or ineffectively addressed by the
mediation profession. These issues all concern power disparities and injustices that are
perpetuated by those current practices, which separate what are considered private issues
from the public realm, and maintain the artificial isolation of individuals from their
communities and social circumstances. Such power disparities and injustices are in
tension with the dedication of mediators to the empowerment of their clients. It is helpful
for further analyzing these problems, and for finding constructive solutions to redress
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those tensions, to organize them into four main issue areas that are not discrete but rather
are interconnected.2 These four key interrelated issue areas are:
1. Social Power Disparities Between Parties Magnified
First, it is already well-recognized that processes such as mediation that
emphasize collaboration within a private setting may sustain and even magnify pre-
existing power disparities among the disputing parties, as legal scholar and ADR
educator Oscar Chase points out (see 2005, 134 and passim; see also Coltri 2004, 339,
351-355; Mayer 2005,141-144). Although it can be empowering for someone in a
marginalized position to be able to engage a privileged person in a nominally fair process
such as mediation, that nominal fairness cannot adequately address deeper socio-
economic inequalities. Perhaps the most widely recognized examples of this effect in the
literature on alternative dispute resolution involve mediation clients with a documented
history of domestic violence. Mediation processes that fail to directly address the effect
of the power relations between the clients when one client has been abusing another
(usually but not always the male partner is the perpetrator and the female partner the
victim of such violence) can allow the abuser to continue exerting coercive power over
the victim, even when no overt threats are made and both clients may appear to be
seeking mutually acceptable solutions (see Busch 2002,passim; Strang and Braithwaite
2002, passim).
However, such social disparities can be perpetuated by current mediation
practices even when there is no history of domestic violence. "The nature of the
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[mediation] process, though evenly applied, can interact with the dynamics of external
power in such a way as to reinforce one party's power and diminish another's," as
Bernard S. Mayer notes:
[IJf I feel that I am under no time pressure to settle a dispute and believe I have
many alternatives, I can use a mediation process to slow things down, obtain more
information, appear flexible to many different alternatives, and in general
strengthen my bargaining position. But if I feel my alternatives are very poor, my
time limited, and my ability to articulate my needs in a rational and dispassionate
way [isJ minimal, then the process of mediation may further disempower me.
(2004, 142).
For example, a woman with limited higher education and trained in a relatively low-
paying service career who has been out of the workforce for years while the primary
caretaker of young children is at an inherent disadvantage when divorcing a better-
educated husband who has worked more or less continuously in a higher-paying career. If
mediation fails to lead to a settlement, such a husband is almost always in a more
advantageous position to actually hire competent lawyers to represent him (even if
nominal resources are provided for the wife to do so) before a judge, which in practical
terms puts pressure on the wife to settle for less than she might if their backgrounds and
situations were more equal in terms of sociological and economic factors. 3
In my experience, clients often will allude to these types of power disparities that
relate to social inequities, such as power disparities based in gender, race, or class
distinctions. A wife may argue that the husband should cede her a greater share of the
jointly owned real property in a settlement because her future earning power is likely to
be less than his. A husband may casually mention his option of withdrawing from
mediation to go to court with "his" lawyer-i.e. the family's lawyer with whom the
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husband had established a close working relationship over the years because he was
presumed by both spouses to be more suited for the role of dealing with legal issue based
on his education and occupation-which leaves the wife without access to such counsel.
(Lawyers may be present in some domestic mediations, but this often is discouraged due
to the adversarial nature of the legal system they are pledged to uphold as officers of the
court and advocates for their clients; see Coltri 2004,37-41,325-27,412-413. Instead,
clients generally are encouraged to consult lawyers and get other expert advice on their
own before signing off on a final agreement in domestic mediation cases; see ibid., 330.)
However, mediators pledged not only to impartiality but also to keeping the focus
on the disputants creating their own private solutions have no grounds on which to ensure
such power disparities are explicitly and effectively addressed. Thus, even if consensus is
reached between the parties, mediation cannot be relied on to provide outcomes that are
either just or enduring when significant power disparities between disputants exist.
2. Private Proceedings Curtail Access to Information Needed to IdentifY and Remedy
Social Problems
Second, because-unlike most court proceedings-mediation is a confidential,
private process, the ability to collect information on problems individual disputants are
facing, to recognize that these problems may be widespread, and to formulate public
policies to address those problems is severely curtailed. This concern has long been
recognized by ADR theorists----eertainly since it was indirectly yet forcefully raised by
Owen M. Fiss in his oft-citedl984 article, "Against Settlement" (see also Luban 2004,
passim). Even before Fiss, mediation critic Richard L. Abel wrote in 1982 that,
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In one respect, informal institutions actually excel their formal counterparts in
individualizing conflict: They operate in total privacy. Although this guarantee of
confidentiality is justified in the name of process [i.e. that parties will be more
willing to forthrightly participate], its effect is to isolate grievants from one
another and from the community, inhibiting the perception ofcommon
grievances.
Yet despite these longstanding criticisms, with some limited exceptions, the issues and
outcomes of ADR cases remain private and isolated from public access.
In mediation, these exceptions include cases where all parties waive
confidentiality, and requirements that mediators report certain serious crimes revealed
during mediation sessions such as abuse of a child. In a few states, legislation has been
adopted requiring that some settlements of lawsuits reached through ADR processes,
including mediation, be made public if governmental entities are involved or if the
settlement involves major consequences to health or environmental safety (Coltri 2004,
391-399 passim; Menkel-Meadow 2004,508-510). However, these limited exceptions do
not encompass most domestic mediation situations. For instance, although the strain shift
work puts on domestic relationships already is well-established (as noted above), when
domestic partners choose mediation to settle disputes related to their divorce or
dissolution of a domestic partnership, the facts about how economic pressures forcing
them to do shift work are causing those mediated divorces or dissolutions remain
undiscoverable for public policy purposes. Even if the parties waive confidentiality, in
most cases effective mechanisms are absent for collecting, reporting, or using any
information that may result from such a waiver for the public interest.
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3. Individual Disputants Bear Burden ofFailure
A third and closely-related problem is that individual disputants must bear the full
weight of their domestic "failures," since there are few or no grounds in the domestic
mediation process to discuss how social factors beyond their control may have
contributed to their situation, nor to bring in community support to help them address
those pressures. Mediator and educator Bernard S. Mayer puts it very well: "[Alternative]
conflict resolution tends to psychologize, personalize, and depoliticize conflicts that are
rooted in social or institutional dynamics." For instance, if "every conflict. ..between
divorcing spouses is framed in terms of relationships, communication, or individual
behavior, then underlying social inequities or systemic problems can easily be lost or
ignored" not only outside of the mediation process, but also within it (2004, 46-47). The
result is a focus by participants in the mediation-both mediators and disputants- on
identifying and trying to address the shortcomings of disputants.
With regard to mediators, an emphasis in domestic mediation practice is often
placed on the mediator's ability to correctly diagnose the "dysfunction" or "negative
manner" of each of the parties and the relationship between them before underlying
issues can be addressed (Taylor 2002,23; Coltri 2004, 156). As an example ofjust one
aspect of this emphasis, consider the information presented by two respected authors of
recent ADR textbooks, Lori S. Coltri and Alison Taylor, with regard to communicative
interactions between disputants both prior to and during the mediation. Taylor lists five
"common patterns of communication," only one of which-"leveler"-is positive in
terms of the possibilities for the "growth and fulfillment." The other four-"placater,"
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"blamer," "computer," and "distracter"-are all negative (ibid., 16-18). Coltri presents
psychologist Morton Duetsch's influential theory of cooperative versus competitive
personal communication styles: Cooperative communication aides "constructive" conflict
resolution; however, many disputants employ a "competitive communication" style
characterized by "autistic hostility," "reactive devaluation," and other "destructive"
patterns (2004, 155-159). This practice of diagnosing negative traits is so widespread in
domestic mediation that Taylor feels compelled to warn against it, despite her own
contributions to the practice:
Normal and abnormal, healthy and sick, functional and dysfunctional, cohesive
and chaotic are ...externaljudgments placed on the family by those outside.
Mediators are cautioned against making premature and often inaccurate,
unnecessary judgments about their clients [such as] labels of dysfunctional, sick
and abnormal. .. (2002,23.)
Communicative interactions are just one area where this particular type of negative
diagnosis by mediators commonly occurs. Many additional examples exist of how
mediation practices reinforce the notion that the fault for domestic problems lies with the
disputants.4
This pattern in mediation practice in turn serves to reinforce the disputants' own
sense that they are the ones who are solely responsible for their domestic problems and
conflicts-that they have only themselves or each other to blame. As mediation critic
Richard L. Abel notes, "The very effort by the mediator to help the grievant understand
his [sic] adversary's behavior tends to convince the former that the latter's conduct was
intentional rather than accidental" (1982,291 ).5 Abel also explicates an aspect of how
informal dispute resolution methods can exacerbate the tendency toward self-blame.
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When a person is caught up in contexts such as ADR where the individualist fallacy
informs how the dispute is framed, that "alienated, atomistic individual who experiences
the world as out of control can only help to control himself' by "blaming oneself in the
first place" (ibid., 286). This dilemma arises because radically autonomous individuals
are deemed the ones who are responsible for their own choices and predicaments that
have led to a dispute, but in reality as interdependent persons they cannot achieve the full
control over their situation that would be necessary to fulfill those expectations of
responsibility: "[I]nformal institutions [such as mediation] perfect the process of
individualization: The complainant comes to see himself as his own worst enemy, the
solution to his problem as entirely within, 'accommodation' as the proper-the only
possible-response" (ibid., 291).Within the individualist paradigm, the way to resolve the
dilemma becomes a stunted control over one's self through "dysfunctional" mechanisms
such as self-blame.
That disputants tend to blame themselves or each other is part of a vicious cycle,
in that such blame is one of the negative patterns mediators are expected to diagnose (e.g.
recall Taylor's "blamer" category). Yet, as noted above, mediators generally are not in a
position to offer disputants resources or guidance that would help them interrupt this
cycle of blame, such as information about the impact of social factors beyond the control
of the disputants. This auto-reinforcing cycle is itself dysfunctional, and symptomatic of
the challenges the mediation profession faces that can be addressed by reforming our
practices based on persons and interdependent, rather than radically autonomous.
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4. Individual Disputants and Mediators Not Accountable to Others Who Are Affected
A fourth problem with current mediation practices (also closely related to the
other three) is that the individual disputants are not necessarily made aware of or required
to be accountable for the effects of their ostensibly private actions, decisions and
agreements on others who are not direct parties to the dispute-and neither are mediators.
These others include both the individuals who are affected but are not directly involved in
the mediation, as well as the wider community and society (see Susskind 2004,passim).
Indeed, particularly in domestic disputes, usually much effort is expended by mediators
to exclude all but the most directly involved "primary" disputants from the private and
confidential mediation proceedings; mediators who do not attend to this task before
proceeding with a mediation are failing to follow recommended practices (see Taylor
2002, 152; Coltri 322, 325, 328-30).
One limited exception to this lack of accountability to others in my experience is
that when the parties in a mediation are parents or guardians of minor children, most
mediators do remind the parties that their children's interests must be prioritized, even
though minor children usually are not present at mediations. One way some mediators do
this is by asking the parties to provide photographs of their children, which are then
displayed in a prominent place during the mediation. The intent is to bring a tangible
presence of the children into the mediation through their photographic representation.
Also, Lori S. Coltri does point out the need for ADR professionals such as
mediators to identify others "who are not directly involved in a conflict but whose
interests may be affected by the process or outcome of the conflict, or who may
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themselves affect the course of the conflict" (2004, 10). Nevertheless, the main reasons
given for this identification process are so that: 1) the mediator can make sure none of
these "constituents" or "stakeholders" are actually direct disputants who should be
brought into the mediation space; and 2) possible resolutions and settlement agreements
can be more effectively crafted and implemented by taking into account those who are
not direct parties to the mediation but nevertheless may have power to impact the
outcome (see ibid, 9-10, 93-100 passim, 132-33,205-206). No specific responsibilities of
the disputants or mediators to those constituents and stakeholders are detailed, and no
recommendations on whether or how to bring them into the mediation space are given
beyond including those who are deemed to be direct disputants (ibid., 10) and allowing
brief visits to help diffuse the power of an "excluded stakeholder" to disrupt settlements
(ibid., 206, 329).
However, even after taking into account such limited exceptions, current
mediation practices inevitably tend not only to prioritize the voices and interests of those
parties who are in the room. Current practices also elide the voices and interests of those
who are not present but nevertheless are involved or affected. Likewise, little if any
consideration is given to the effects of disputes resolution processes and outcomes on the
broader community or society, let alone what should be done about those effects.
How Did Mediation Get to This Problematic Juncture?
How did mediation get to this problematic juncture, where a promising practice
that was intended to empower people and address the lack of services to assist them in
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creatively resolving domestic disputes has proven to have such limited efficacy and, in
some cases, may even be exacerbating the concerns mediation was originally intended to
address? As psychologist and mediator Peter T. Coleman points out, "Feminists argue
that power differences may begin with our images but persist through the structures and
institutions of a society. Thus, power in any given situation must be understood in its
historical context." Such a historically situated understanding in turn compels "us to look
beyond the current surface manifestations of power and into its deep structure" (2000,
119). Before proceeding it is important to consider in more detail how domestic
mediation as currently practiced has come to be shaped by its ongoing reliance on
assumptions about the radical autonomy of individuals that underpin much of our legal
system, while leaving out many of the aspects of the legal system that help to meliorate
those assumptions, such as the ability to bring public policy to bear on problems that
negatively impact individuals but are beyond their control (see Fiss 1984; Luban 2004).
Rather than a deliberate commitment on the part of ADR theorists and
practitioners, I believe this reliance on the assumption of the radical autonomy of
individuals largely has been received as an unwitting inheritance from certain parts of our
political and legal traditions (see Coltri 2004, 32-34). This unwitting inheritance has been
enabled and exacerbated by the undertheorizing of how our fundamental interdependence
relates to concepts of power, which leads to a narrow focus on individual independence
and dependence instead, as Deborah Kolb and Linda Putnam have explained (see 2005,
142-1440). This is not to say that there has been a complete lack of recognition of these
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issues. For example, sociologist and conflict resolution professor Joseph A. Scimecca
asserted in 1993,
ADR, like formal law, is embedded in individualism. As such, the fundamental
principle of individual responsibility is seen as the cause of conflict. This focus
enhances social control by not looking to structured inequalities in the society as a
reason for conflict. Grievances are trivialized and the basic social structure is
rarely, if ever, questioned. The assumption is that rational individuals should be
able to resolve their conflicts, and if they cannot, then the problem lies with them.
(217)
There is some evidence that these problematic assumptions have been exacerbated by our
incomplete contemporary understanding of the long and multi-faceted history of
extralegal dispute resolution in the United States, which if better known arguably could
provide a richer set of resources on which to base our current practices. Of three widely
cited sources on the history of ADR, for instance, none mentions the important influence
of the community-based Settlement House movement associated with Jane Addams and
others (Auerbach 1983, Barrett 2004, and Menkel-Meadow 2003a).6 However, in part
because mediation in general and domestic mediation in particular only emerged as a
recognized professional practice in the United States during the 1970s (Barrett 2004, 177-
80, 185-87; see also Scimecca 1993,211-12) and became widespread in the 1980s
(Barrett 2004, 209-211, 214-19), two relatively recent developments likely had a more
direct impact on shaping current US mediation practices than our impoverished
knowledge of ADR history may have had: first, the link between issues in family law
with newly-delineated constitutional rights to privacy as the ADR profession was
forming; and, second, concurrent socio-economic changes.?
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With regard to the first development, long before mediation coalesced as a
profession in the 1970s criticisms of the law's conception of persons were being made.
For instance, Mary Parker Follett claimed early in the twentieth century,
Our nineteenth-century legal theory (individual rights, contract, 'a man can do
what he likes with his own,' etc.) was based on the conception of the separate
individual. We can have no sound legal doctrine, and hence no social or political
progress, until the fallacy of this idea is truly recognized. (1918,61; emphasis
added)
Other feminist philosophers and ADR theorists and practitioners share Follett's view that
this "Individualist ideology that is central to the mainstream culture of the United States"
can be traced back at least to the 1800s, as mediators Joseph Folger and Robert Baruch
Bush point out (1994, 12-13). However, political philosopher Michael Sandel argues that
the most significant shift in the legal conception of persons as radically autonomous
individuals occurred relatively recently, and is marked by a key 1972 United States
Supreme Court decision on whether married couples should have ready access to
contraceptives: "The explicit change was to redescribe the bearers of privacy rights from
persons qua participants in the social institution of marriage to persons qua individuals,
independent oftheir roles or attachments" (1998,97; emphasis added). In a culture that
was already susceptible to the individualist fallacy, this recent shift in the legal
conception of persons was concurrent with the development of mediation as a profession
in the United States (Bush and Folger 1994, 1-2), and had a significant effect on both
theory and practice.
With regard to the second development, during the 20th century, particularly after
World War II and accelerating after the Viet Nam war-again, as the profession of
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mediation was being formed-a number of economic and social changes took place that
altered the sources and character of many interpersonal disputes in the United States (see
Abel 1982, 285; Auerbach 1983, 10-11, 120). Among these changes were that residents
of the fast-growing suburbs were no longer living as members of tight-knit ethnic
communities as had once been common; instead, they often barely knew anyone in their
neighborhood outside immediate family members except in some cases a few "next door"
neighbors. Active membership in stable religious communities that might otherwise have
helped mediate or settle disputes fell for a variety ofreasons. For example, as marriage
across rather than within religious and ethnic communities, as well as divorce, became
more common and socially acceptable, distance from traditional religious communities
that discouraged such practices increased. Schools became larger, while the increasing
numbers of working women, the rising economic pressures for both parents (and for the
increasing number of single heads of households) to work long hours, and even busing
students long distances with the aim of desegregation, all made it more difficult for
parents to be involved in their children's activities both inside and outside the home.
Employers hired increasing numbers of workers on an "at will" rather than "life-time"
basis, while support of and membership in unions declined and so on.
Mary Parker Follett's description in 1918 still serves as an excellent summary of
what these changes wrought, starting in her century and continuing into ours:
We work, we spend most of our waking hours working for some one of whose life
we know nothing, who knows nothing of us; we pay rent to a landlord whom we
never see or see only once a month, and yet our home is our most precious
possession; we have a doctor who is with us in crucial moments of birth and
death, but whom we ordinarily do not meet; we buy our food, our clothes, our
32
fuel, of automatons for the selling of food, clothes and fuel. We know all these
people in their occupational capacity, not as men like ourselves with hearts like
ours, desires like ours, hopes like ours. And this isolation from those who minister
to our lives, to whose lives we minister, does not bring us any nearer to our
neighbors in their isolation. (190)
In short, from at least the beginning of the last century and increasingly so up to the
present, residents of the United States have found many of our close dealings are with
near strangers who often represent large institutions, while we often are isolated in
domestic relationships that are not firmly embedded in a broader community. Thus, we
find ourselves without apparent recourse to traditional community-based resources that
could help us prevent and resolve disputes as they arise.
Yet the court systems remain ill equipped to offer effective, affordable and fair
services for domestic disputes, such as those between divorcing spouses. Those in
socially and legally marginalized positions remain particularly leery of the official court
system (see Auerbach 1983, 120, 134-36). As a result, many separate courts and legal
processes with stream-lined or specialized processes were established or expanded, such
as divorce courts and small claims courts that do not require representation by an
attorney. But soon these venues also became clogged, and parties to disputes at all levels
of the court systems were encouraged and sometimes even required to at least attempt to
settle their differences privately outside of court (Auerbach 1983, 120-21; Coltri 2004,
55, 310-311). Arbitration and other allied negotiation processes, such as mediation with
arbitration as the fallback if a mutually acceptable settlement was not reached, were a
significant part of this push toward alternative dispute resolution from the legal system,
as they had been in meeting the needs of trade and organized labor disputes.
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However, having strangers in the form of arbitrators with significant power to
make intimate and life-altering decisions such as what the final terms of divorce or child
custody arrangements should be--{)utside of the safeguards of formal and generally
public legal processes aimed at justice-was troubling for many disputants, and for many
of the arbitrators as well. Thus, the professional practice ofmediation, and especially
domestic mediation, as a private and confidential process that emphasizes the importance
of the disputants creating their own mutually acceptable solutions in a non-coercive
setting arose out of this growing need to address such concerns in the context ofour still-
overtaxed courts (Mayer 2004,66-68; Barrett 2004,216-17). At the same time, this is a
legal system that at the highest levels was reconfiguring notions of privacy as inhering in
radically autonomous individuals, now conceived to be largely independent of
community or social relations. As the profession ofmediation was forming, this newly-
delineated notion of privacy as explicitly inhering in radically autonomous individuals
was uncritically adopted by mediators, and applied to their view of their clients and of
what constitutes minimally acceptable mediation practices (see Abel 1982,285-86,289-
90; Scimecca 1993, 217).
A Working Definition of the Individualist Fallacy
Before proceeding, I believe it is useful to provide the following "working
definition" summary of the individualist fallacy based on the above discussion. The
mistaken idea of the radically autonomous individual-the individualist fallacy--entails
the claim or assumption that a human person is fundanlentally or primarily a self-
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sufficient entity who exists prior to and independent of social relations. At a minimum,
each such self-sufficient person is presumed to have the capability, or at least the
potential, for identifying and providing for his or her own basic needs and wants. This
potential is usually assumed to be realizable only in a person who fits certain norms
regarding maturity, mental and physical ability, and so forth; children, for example,
generally have not been assumed to be capable offull self-sufficiency. A further claim or
assumption entailed in the idea of radical autonomy is that the individual is not only
capable of but also responsible for providing for his or her own basic needs and wants. In
the ADR context, this responsibility extends to any need or desire the individual may
have to address and resolve conflicts. Following Mary Parker Follett's theory, the
assumption that human persons are radically autonomous is a mistake because individual
personhood cannot exist outside interdependent relationships; to assert that it can is not
only erroneous, but also leads mediators away from solutions that would address many of
the problems with current mediation practice. Follett's argument will be addressed in
more detail in the next chapter.
Summary
In this chapter, I have explicated four key interrelated problems with mediation
practice that contribute significantly to the challenges the mediation profession, and
particularly domestic mediation, currently is facing. Each of these four key problems
highlights the tension between the mediation profession's core value of empowerment
and particular aspects of mediation practice that subvert realizing that value. I also
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outlined the social and legal conditions that contributed to how the mediation profession
has developed, focusing on the unwitting reliance on the mistaken idea that persons are
radically autonomous individuals, and provided a "working definition" of this idea which
I term the "individualist fallacy."
The next chapter will address how the uncritical assumption of radical autonomy
by the mediation profession is not supportable on a theoretical or practical basis,
especially with regard to theory that is to be applied within the context of domestic
mediation practices. Specifically, I now tum to explicating how an in-depth analysis of
Mary Parker Follett's theory offers an alternative conception of empowerment based on
persons as interdependent rather than radically autonomous-a conception which can be
used as the theoretical basis for reforming current mediation practices. While defense of
the claims that the notion of the radically autonomous individual is fallacious and that
interdependence is real may prove to have general validity, my purpose is limited to
defending the validity and efficacy of those claims only as they apply in the ADR
context.
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Notes for Chapter II
1 The tenn "extralegal" (or "nonlegal") is sometimes used as a synonym for "illegal." However,
here these tenns simply indicate dispute resolution practices other than fonnallegal processes of
government court systems.
2 I do not claim these four issue areas exhaust the problems mediation currently faces, but rather
that these are the most central and important to address in the context ofthis critique. For
discussion of the challenges mediation faces that include issues beyond the four central ones
presented here, see for example Lori S. Coltri (2004, 383-420) and Bernard S. Mayer (2004,
passim). Michael Benjamin and Howard H. Irving provide a useful description of "ten specific
assertions" of the "feminist critique of family mediation" (1992, 131-134); however, almost all of
these assertions could be categorized within the four issue areas presented here.
3 Elizabeth Ellen Gordon (2002) provides a useful overview and explication ofthe documented
effects of gender-based power disparities.
4 Mediators also may sometimes be assigned a measure of responsibility if disputants fail to reach
a settlement; however, in my experience this responsibility is limited to the mediator's inability to
diagnose and address the "negative" characteristics of the disputants as they apply to the
mediation process. The responsibility for the situation that led to or underlies the dispute still is
presumed to lie solely with the disputants.
5 Because Follett wrote in a time when it was common practice to use the tenn "man" or "men" or
masculine pronouns to refer in general to human beings including women, I am preserving that
usage as is in direct quotations from her work. However, in otherwise useful quotations from
more contemporary works, the first instance ofthe gratuitous use of a masculine tenn to refer to
human persons in general or a person who may well be female is marked with a "[sic]."
6 One of these ADR histories does mention Addams, but only in a passing reference to her views
on the Pullman strike (Auerbach 1983, 62).
7 Despite this impoverished history, Patrick Coy and Timothy Hedeen document a resurgence of
community-based mediation programs in the US during the 1970s that "were successfully
established and then partly maintained because they were embedded within the context of a
supportive, reinforcing cultural environment" (2005, 408)--which is congruent with the ethos of
earlier movements such as the Settlement Houses. However, Coy and Hedeen also trace the "co-
optation" of the resurgent community-based programs by legal and other processes that were and
are not as embedded in the communities they ostensibly serve (ibid., 406 and passim).
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT IN
MEDIATION: RECLAIMING MARY PARKER FOLLETT'S WORK
The previous chapter explicated the challenges currently facing the mediation
profession, focusing on how we have arrived at this impasse created by the tension
between realizing the value of empowerment and relying on mediation practices that are
rooted in the individualist fallacy. In this chapter, I first address why feminist-pragmatist
philosopher Mary Parker Follett's work is particularly important to reclaim in light of the
challenges currently facing the mediation profession. Then I explicate the theory behind
better-known aspects of Follett's dispute resolution practices, focusing on the preference
for ADR methods that are based on empowerment as "power-with" rather than "power-
over." Building on this relatively familiar ground, I present a deeper analysis of the
theory that undergirds Follett's practices, showing how the rejection of the individualist
fallacy (as well as any sharp division between the public and private spheres) in favor of
a conception of power consistent with interdependence is central to her work and key to
solving mediation's challenges. Finally, to help demonstrate how a deeper understanding
of Follett's theoretical insights is directly applicable to the project of constructively
reforming current domestic mediation practices, I use Follett's conception of
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empowerment based on the interdependence of persons to reanalyze two similar domestic
mediation case studies presented by renowned mediation theorists and practitioners
Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger. Although Bush and Folger emphasize the
negative impact of the individualist paradigm on the mediation profession and advocate
for a more relational approach to mediation, this reanalysis shows how pernicious the
individualist fallacy is, since they too resort to the notion of individuals as radically
autonomous.
Why Mary Parker Follett?
Before addressing why reclaiming Mary Parker Follett's work is so important, it
should be noted that Mary Parker Follett certainly-and fortunately-is not the only
theorist whose work merits our further attention with regard to the issues I address here.
As just two examples among many, we could tum to two thinkers whom Follett credits as
having had a significant influence on the theory she developed that undergirds her
practical applications, German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel and American philosopher
Josiah Royce (see Mattson 1998, xlii-xliv; Tonn 2003, 120-22,293-94).1 Nevertheless, I
have chosen to focus on Follett for this project for two main reasons. First, Follett was a
dedicated dispute resolution practitioner who both insisted on seeking and providing
theoretical foundations for her methods, and resolutely insisted on putting her theories to
the test of practice. Her work is addressed to both philosophers and dispute resolution
practitioners, and helps bridge any divide between the two fields, and so is particularly
appropriate for my own task of bringing together these two disciplines in the service of
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developing empowering and nonviolent practices to resolve our conflicts. As Follett
herself asserts, we must "get behind academic abstractions and traditional conceptions
and try for a thoroughly realistic treatment of authority, power, leadership and control"
(1942b, 314). Likewise, with Follett we are not confronted by any significant divide
between theory and practice. On the contrary, such a divide would be antithetical to both
her philosophical and practical commitments (see Menkel-Meadow 2003a, 11; Mattson
1998, liv).
Second, in both her theory and her practice Follett was committed to what we
today could call a feminist-pragmatist approach, which makes her work particularly
helpful for the constructive feminist critique of mediation practices I am undeliaking
here.2 Follett was not especially dedicated to causes that promote the empowerment of
women qua women. For instance, despite her skepticism about the efficacy of
representative voting schemes for realizing either individual or group empowerment, she
did support the women's suffrage movement but only took on local leadership roles
within it (Follett 1918, 5, 157,256; Tonn 2003,179). Nevertheless, her often-
unacknowledged theoretical contributions undergird and are compatible with many
feminist commitments (see Mansbridge 1998,passim).
However, there is a particular difficulty that alternative dispute resolution
theorists and practitioners face with regard to Follett: we generally have received only a
the practice~orientedportion of her work. For example, here is a typical summary of her
contributions, from Jerome Barrett's A History ofAlternative Dispute Resolution:
40
In the early twentieth century, Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933), a... social worker
and pioneer in the areas of informal education and community building had talked
about interest-based conflict resolution. Her books The New State (1918) and
Creative Experience (1924) also developed the subject. A book of her speeches,
Dynamic Administration, published posthumously in 1935, also advanced her
arguments for an interest-based focus. Follett was one of the first people to apply
psychological insight and social science findings to the study of industrial
organization and conflict. (2004,210)
This is true as far as it goes.3 These practical applications Follett developed while
working as a social worker and industrial consultant are relatively well known; she even
has been called the "mother" of ADR.4 Follett's own ability in shorter works, such as the
speeches and papers collected in Dynamic Administration, to deftly summarize her theory
with a few well-chosen key words and examples-as well as her emphasis on putting that
theory to use in practical applications-has no doubt contributed to this problem. As the
editors of a later edition of Dynamic Administration point out, "in tailoring her remarks to
practical rather than to theoretically inclined audiences, she often gave bits of practical
advice and mentioned only in passing the fundamental concepts from which the advice
was derived." Yet those theoretical concepts of Follett's are "essential to a full
appreciation ofthe depth and broad relevance of her contribution" (Fox and Urwick
1982, xxii).
Follett herself likely would have been quite worried about the relatively one-
dimensional aspect of how her work has been handed down to us. For example, we know
that she often went out of her way to proselytize for the need to bring together theoretical
insights, including those from varied disciplines, and apply them to practice. Follett
points out this is necessary in order to get a foothold on such seemingly intractable
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problems as the prevalence of unproductive and even violent disputes. Moreover, Follett
not only advocated for an explicitly interdisciplinary approach, she embodied it. She
explains that Creative Experience was written in part so that "we might get an
appreciation of the full import of certain conceptions in one field of study by a
cognizance of their value in other fields ... the cross-fertilizations ...which are now going
on are worthy of recognition" (1924, xvii). Since there is continued emphasis on this need
for an interdisciplinary approach to the ADR field, as mediation educators Michael
Moffitt and Robert Bordone have summarized (2005, 6-8), Follett is a great resource in
this regard as well.
The Theory Behind the Mediation Profession's Commitment to Empowerment
As noted above, the practical applications of Mary Parker Follett's theory that
she developed while working as a social worker and industrial consultant who pioneered
ADR methods are well known. However, informing Follett's methods is valuable original
theoretical work she undertook in the then-nascent pragmatist philosophical
tradition-work that still is not fully integrated into mediation practices. For example,
Follett's key precept that empowerment through the productive resolution of disputes
takes place only within a context where the parties enjoy "power with" rather than
"power over" one another is so widespread, it is difficult to find either theoretical or
practical works on ADR that do not mention it (although often any reference to Follett as
a source is omitted). Follett's precept often serves as an explicit rationale for specific
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alternative dispute resolution practices, and for the preference of mediation over other
practices such as arbitration.5
It is important at this juncture to review the theoretical grounds for Follett's
theory of empowerment, since her work does provide an excellent base for the values
mediation practitioners seek to incorporate into our applied methods-yet as a profession
we remain largely unaware of how and why Follett's well-developed philosophical
conception of "power-over" versus "power with" affords such a strong theoretical base
for preferring mediation over other forms of dispute resolution. Nevertheless, as will be
shown later in this critique, merely achieving a better understanding ofthis aspect of
Follett's theory on its own is not sufficient for addressing the current challenges the
mediation profession faces. We will also need to go deeper into her theory to lmderstand
why we must move away from practices that are based on the two related notions that
individuals are radically autonomous, and that traditionally private concerns should be
kept separate from public ones.
With that caveat, Follett's theoretical approach to empowerment indeed does
provide us with a grounding for the mediation profession's conviction that while conflict
may be inevitable in all human affairs, including domestic relations, such conflict does
not necessarily have to be detrimental, and can even be beneficial-that is, empowering
for all those involved. Follett gives a detailed account in both theoretical and practical
terms of why there is so much confusion about what exactly the problems are that lead to
conflict. Such confusion occurs because any problem will necessarily arise in the context
of a "situation [that] changes faster than anyone can report on it" (1924, 9). This dynamic
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and temporal aspect of the situations we always find ourselves in as human beings is
crucial to recognize. And if change is inevitable, so is conflict because-as Follett points
out-at its base conflict is simply the name we have given "the appearance of difference,
difference of opinions, difference of interests. For that is what conflict
means-difference" (1942a, 30). The ever-changing nature of our situations creates new
differences.
Follett's formulation from Creative Experience of the ways we can deal with
difference is: "When differing interests meet, they need not oppose but only confront
each other. The confronting of interests may result in either one of four things: (1)
voluntary submission of one side; (2) struggle and the victory of one side the other; (3)
compromise; or (4) integration" (1924, 156). In a later paper on "Constructive Conflict,"
Follett boils this down to "three main ways of dealing with conflict: domination,
compromise, and integration," since voluntary submission can be included as a form of
compromise (1942a, 31). It is worthwhile to examine each of these three in light of
Follett's theoretical approach.
First, with regard to domination, Follett does not just assert that confronting
conflict through integration or "power-with" is better than doing so through forceful
opposition or wielding "power-over.,,6 Instead, she is careful to ground this axiom in
theory. She introduces her concern with "power-over" this way in Creative Experience:
What is the central problem ofsocial relations? It is the question ofpower; this is
the problem of industry, of politics, of international affairs ...We frequently hear
nowadays of 'transferring' power as the panacea for all our ills ...but the
transference of power has been the whole course of history-power passing to
priests or kings or barons, to councilor soviet. (1924, xii; emphasis added)
44
Thus, the danger with domination is not solely due to the coercion, and often explicitly
violent coercion, required to enforce it. Another main problem with domination has an
important temporal aspect, that is, it simply does not work over time. As Follett notes in
an understated way, domination "is the easiest way of dealing with conflict, the easiest
for the moment but not for the long run, as we see from what has happened since the
War" (1942a, 31). This is true even if the aim of using dominating force is for some
greater good; recall that the specific war she refers to, World War I, was fought by some
in the name of peace as "the war to end all wars."
Follett's empirical analysis of historical situations reveals that reliance on
domination merely ends up with an unstable shifting of control, rather than a progressive
resolution of the conflicts that arise out of our differences (1942a, 35). It is important to
emphasize here that Follett's theory of power shows coercion or "power over" does not
benefit even the dominators over time, since this can seem counter-intuitive. As
psychologist and mediator Peter T. Coleman explicates,
From a practical perspective, a chronic competitive approach to power has
harmful consequences ... [R]eliance on competitive and coercive strategies of
influence by power holders produces alienation and resistance in those subjected
to power...If the goal of the power holder is to achieve commitment from
subordinates (rather than merely short-term compliance), excessive reliance on a
power-over strategy eventually proves to be costly as well as largely ineffective.
(2000, 122)
Moreover, the costs of a domination strategy accrue not only to nation-states or captains
of industry, but also within the types of relationships that mediation addresses (ibid).
Even when the aim is ostensibly to achieve a "balance of power"-that is, a balance of
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the forces of those who seek to dominate-Follett points out that no progress is made:
In fact, observation of industrial controversy for the last ten years leads me to
think that those disputes which are' settled' merely by the balance of power are
not really settled at all. The slightest shift of power brings the matter up again
with accumulated rancor and hard feeling. The balance theory gets us nowhere in
law or politics or international relations. (1942a, 45; emphasis added)
At best, a "static" equilibrium is attained that often is so fragile, it also requires enormous
resources to maintain on the one hand, yet on the other the slightest difficulty can upset it
(1924, 181-82).
Follett's point about the uselessness of the "balance theory" also applies to
dispute resolution in other contexts, such as domestic mediation. As Follett notes, "It is
surprising how often we can succeed in finding the unifying solution in our everyday
affairs one we begin to search for it: either with members of our family ...or our friends or
fellow-workers" (1924, 161-62). Follett's insistence that any approach based on
"balancing" is problematic in all situations involving disputes is of particular importance
in the context of helping mediation clients to confront their differences rather than avoid
them, which in turn leads to nonproductive compromises.
In many mediations--especially those involving conflicts that arise in the context
of family situations such as divotce or child custody-mediators must face the strong
temptation to accept the insistence of the disputants that there is no need to address
certain issues. These are issues that often come to the mediator's attention because one or
both parties will mention they are not satisfied with the current situation, but at the same
time it becomes clear a compromise-based detente of sorts has been reached that both
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parties are quite reluctant to disturb since there has been a short-term lessening of
tensions as a result. Yet my experience is in keeping with Follett's theory: mediation
agreements that result from the tacit desire to avoid confronting significant issues because
to do so would disturb the current balance of power in a relationship may provide short-
term relief, but are doomed to failure over time. This conclusion also supports an
emphasis in the domestic mediation process on aiding the disputants in addressing
directly all the issues necessary to help ensure that their own, and their children's, needs
will be met over the longer term.
Another important underpinning for preferring methods that incorporate Follett's
approach to integration or "power with" is that here we find more theoretical support for
how the mediation process has the potential for working effectively to help disputants
fmd creative and empowering resolutions to their conflicts, despite the problems that
arise from current practices. Follett notes that, even within dispute resolution processes
that are not explicitly focused on integration, the real solutions always emerge from
moments when the parties somehow find room to collaborate with each other rather than
focus on adjusting to demands through mechanisms of domination or compromise. For
example, she cites a labor arbitrator as confiding, "the secret of arbitration in labor
disputes is not adjustment but invention"; and she notes an industrial leader advised her,
"I find that we come to agreement not by adjusting ... our ideas [to each other], but by
finding the new idea which is always something different from the addition ofthe
previous ideas" (ibid., 117; emphasis added).
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Perhaps Follett's most famous illustration of the creative solutions that arise from
a joint process ofproblem-solving is from her personal experience-although she is not
necessarily famous for it since the authors of the influential 1981 book, Getting to Yes,
used Follett's example almost word-for-word without any direct attribution (Mansbridge
1998, xxiii-xxiv; see also Tonn 2003,381)7:
In the Harvard Library one day, in one ofthe small rooms, someone wanted the
window open, I wanted it shut. We opened the window in the next room, where
no one was sitting. This was not a compromise because there was no curtailing of
desire. We both got what we really wanted. For I did not want a closed room, I
simply did not want the north wind to blow directly on me; likewise the other
occupant did not want a particular window open, but merely wanted more air in
the room. (l942a, 32)8
Granted, this is a relatively straightforward situation because only two people's desires
were involved, the time frame within which those desires would pertain was short, and
there was another room with another window available. Moreover, the consequences
would be minimal if a creative resolution had not been found or if there had been a resort
to compromise---confined to some minor physical discomfort on the part of one or the
other person or perhaps both if they had opted for a "window half-open" approach, or
else one person might have been inconvenienced by having to move to another room.
Follett provides another example to illustrate what she means by the creative
possibilities opened up by a joint or integrative approach to dispute resolution, in this
case one that is somewhat more complex and relates directly to domestic mediation. She
recounts the experience of her friends, a couple who were having a disagreement over
whether to send their son away to a boarding school that offered the high academic
standards the father prioritized, or to enroll him in a school in their community that would
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allow them to make sure his friends were appropriate as the mother thought most
important. They were able to resolve their conflict without either one having to
significantly compromise, by diligently searching for a school with high academic
standards that also was close enough to home to allow them to monitor the social
situation, combined with a summer sleep-away camp that provided some benefits of a
boarding school experience. The concerns of both the father and the mother were
satisfied by this solution. Follett adds that if such a school had not been available locally,
they still would not have had to give in to a compromise or resort to other forms of
coercion (such as the father insisting that as the head of the household, the final decision
should be his). As just one example, Follett notes they could have considered starting a
school with high academic standards themselves that could benefit not only their son but
also other children in the community (ibid., 1924, 162). Although in this particular
situation the parents were able to reach a creative solution on their own without
assistance from a formal mediation process, the value of the mediator's role in helping
disputants in complex situations focus on possible resolutions that avoid compromise and
other forms of coercion is clear.
The stakes are higher with regard to the negative consequences if there is a resort
to coercion or compromise when the number of different interests that need to be satisfied
is larger, or the resolution sought needs to be viable over a longer timeframe while
changes continue to unfold, or the resources that can be brought to bear on a situation are
more limited--or conversely, are more abundant and varied. Any of these factors, alone
or in combination, adds to the complexity of the problem and the difficult of reaching a
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mutually acceptable creative outcome. The challenge is, rather than trying to eliminate
the differences that underlie such complexity, to "do away with muddle" as Follett puts it
(ibid., 6; see also 24, 69). She notes that one way to do this is whenever possible (without
losing sight of the whole situation) to break up complex problems involving multiple
disputants into "single situations"-"employer and employee, landlord and tenant, or
whatever the case may be." Employing this practice of untangling the relationships
between the disputants as one part of the dispute resolution process can help clarify the
different interests and needs of each party, as well as help reveal possible effective
resolutions that avoid compromise (1924, 188; see also 1942e, 60). And indeed, there is
always a risk of failure in such complex situations. Follett explicitly acknowledges that in
some situations productive resolution may not be possible, adding "I do not say that there
is no tragedy in life" (1942a, 38). Yet she insists, "I believe that in every
conflict-between persons or nations, classes or races-this method [for finding creative
resolutions] should be tried" (1924,43).9 The theoretical basis for the practice of such
creative invention has its roots in Follett's commitment to a conception of conflict as
arising out of inevitable difference, out of the ever-changing dynamic and temporal
aspects of our experiences, which always take place in an interactive context.
But Follett goes further, since she shows that without conflict as the state of being
at variance with or in opposition to others, solving new problems or fmding new and
better solutions to old ones is next to impossible. For it is out of the different and
changing views about why, and how, and who, and what, and when, that creative
solutions are to be found that are virtually always better than if those involved in a given
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situation proceed automatically, in a state of unquestioning, predetermined accord (let
alone unquestioning, predetermined opposition). As Follett explicates, "What people
often mean by getting rid of conflict is getting rid of diversity, and it is of the utmost
importance that these should not be considered the same." Rather, "fear of difference is
dread of life itself. It is possible to conceive conflict as not necessarily a wasteful
outbreak of incompatibles, but a normal process by which socially valuable differences
register themselves for the enrichment of all concerned" (1924, 300, 301) Follett provides
a useful everyday example of how this can work in practice:
Perhaps the most familiar example of the evolving of a group idea is a committee
meeting. The object of a committee meeting is fIrst of all to create a common
idea. I do not go to a committee meeting to give my own ideas. If that were all, I
might write my fellow-members a letter. But neither do I go to learn other
people's ideas. If that were all, I might ask each to write me a letter. I go to a
committee meeting in order that all together we may create a group idea, an idea
which will be better than anyone of our ideas alone, moreover which will be
better than all of our ideas added together. For this group idea will not be
produced by any process of addition, but by the interpenetration of us all. (1918,
24)
Follett's term for what results from the type of process that enriches our lives rather than
overpowering our differences, and thus leads to creative solutions, is ''progressive
experience" (ibid., 106). Follett wants us to fully recognize how, like domination,
compromise blocks the progress that results from the meaningful solutions and actions
generated by creative, interactive, noncoercive attention to our differences-and to our
conflicts.
Moreover by its very nature, compromise-perhaps even more than
domination-tends to stifle the conflict that is necessary for integration, which is also the
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conflict that is necessary for making real progress in finding solutions to the problems we
confront. If we try to stifle conflict in the name of conflict resolution, that conflict does
not disappear, but rather festers in a way that makes integration unlikely or impossible.
This is a large measure of why Follett is so emphatic that "integrative experience is
always progressive experience" (ibid.). If a main goal of conflict resolution is to help
those involved make real progress in resolving their conflicts, it is futile to try to
decouple conflict from conflict resolution-and futile to avoid confronting the full import
of that conflict by compromising. Thus, Follett's theoretical work further assures
mediators that the time and effort we urge and encourage our clients to put into
confronting their differences through the open-ended creative process of mediation is
justified, because that is the only possible way real, lasting, productive solutions can be
achieved. And yet merely achieving a better understanding of these particular aspects of
Follett's theory remains insufficient for addressing the current challenges the mediation
profession faces. We must delve deeper to realize why the mediation profession should
move away from practices that are rooted in the individualist fallacy.
Reclaiming What We Are Missing from Follett's Theory of Empowerment
As detailed above, most dispute resolution practitioners and theorists are not
aware of the philosophical depth that undergirds Mary Parker Follett's advocacy of
empowerment-"power with" versus "power over"-that has been so widely adopted in
the ADR field, and particularly in the professional practice of mediation. This reliance on
partial theoretical resources has in tum led to mediation practices that are only partially
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empowering, as is the case when mediators allow disputants to negotiate agreements that
include compromises; or may even be disempowering, as is the case when mediators are
unable to redress the replication in the mediation process ofwidespread social dynamics
based on "power over." However, there is a further and even more problematic omission
in our theoretical understanding that cripples the ability of our practice to empower our
clients: Empowerment on Follett's terms has been widely adopted without Follett's
commitment to rejecting the notion of the radically autonomous individual, along with
her rejection of any fundamental separation of the public and private "spheres," which the
notion of individual autonomy often entails. Indeed, these commitments preceded
Follett's theorizing of empowerment; the theoretical and practical justifications for the
efficacy of practices that employ "power with" is grounded in her conception of persons
as interdependent, and in the related necessity of working across boundaries that would
traditionally be termed the "public" and "private" spheres. lO Moreover, the creative
integration of interests that leads to the real resolution of conflicts on Follett's
terms-that is, on terms that cohere with the core values of the mediation profession-is
unrealizable without a concept of empowerment that is firmly rooted in such
interdependent, interactive concepts ofpersons and social communities.
Follett is clear and emphatic on these points at least as early as The New State,
published in 1918: "The individual is created by the social process and is daily nourished
by that process. There is no such thing as the self-made man. What we think we possess
as individuals is what is stored up from society, is the subsoil of social life" (1918, 61-
62). Moreover, "we call1lot put the individual on one side and society on the other, we
53
must understand the complete interrelation of the two" (ibid., 61). She adds, "There is no
line where the life of the home ends and the life of the city begins. There is no wall
between my private life and my public life" (ibid., 189). In a helpful footnote, Follett
provides a "list of words which can be used to describe the genuine social process and a
list which gives exactly the wrong idea of it" (ibid., 39) to help clarify what she means by
this inseparable interactive process between the individual and the community, and
between public and private:
Good words: integrate, interpenetrate, interpermeate, compenetrate, compound,
harmonize, correlate, coordinate, interweave [or interknit], reciprocally relate or
adapt or adjust, etc. Bad words: fuse, melt, amalgamate, assimilate, weld,
dissolve, absorb, reconcile (if used in Hegelian sense), etc. (ibid., 39n; see also
35)
Moreover, words are not "good" or "bad" merely based on their descriptive utility.
Whatever we do, we do in a context of interdependence and thus of collective action,
which encompasses the political: "the scope of politics should be our whole social life"
(ibid., 183). This is so even within the artificial confines of the "private" sphere: "in fact
the whole area of our daily life should constitute politics" (ibid., 189; see also 182). And
this context of collective action entails an ethical dimension: "Collectively to discover
and follow certain principals of action [as relation] makes for individual freedom"
(1942b, 304; see also 307). That is, because our "interests are inextricably interwoven,"
we must recognize that the key "question is not what is best for me or for you, but for all
of us" (1918, 81). However, Follett is not advocating a "melting pot" version of social
interaction. To the contrary, "my individualism is difference springing into view as
relating itself with other differences" (1918, 64). The answers to that critical question
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about what is best cannot involve erasure of the diverse characteristics and interests of
each individual and each conununity, or we are constraining our ability to act at all.
Follett's Conception of the Human Person
To see why this is so, a fuller explication of Follett's conception of the human
person as interdependent and socially embedded is helpful. For Follett, it is not simply
that there is "no chasm" between different persons, between the individual person and the
community or society, or between the public and private spheres. Rather, individuals
actually are constituted in, through, and by their interactions with each other, including
interactions across any artificial divisions between the public and the private (1918, 60,
61, 189). By the same token, individuals and society are also co-constituted: "The only
reality is the relating of [society] to the [individual], which creates both. The only reality
is the interpenetrating of the two into experience ... the relation of individual to society is
not action and reaction, but the infinite interactions by which both individual and society
are forever a-making" (ibid., 60-61; emphasis added). Without the individual person,
other persons do not and cannot exist as either individuals or collectively as communities
or societies-and without other persons, the individual does not and cannot exist. Thus,
the notion ofpersons as radically autonomous individuals is a fallacy because persons do
not and cannot exist at all absent interdependent relationships with other persons.
Moreover, even if one were to hold that human persons could somehow exist
independent of others, any such radically autonomous individuals would be also be
radically disempowered because the existence of human persons as individuals takes place
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only through interaction with others: On Follett's account, and the account I defend here
with regard to the theory that should inform mediation practices, the only power persons
have to act at all is interdependent and coactive. Any notion of the radically autonomous
individual necessarily would also be a notion of the individual as powerless. Part of the
"fiction" (ibid., 60) Follett identifies at the core of this fallacy is that a radically
autonomous person could be empowered at all, much less by virtue ofthat autonomy.
Follett's theoretical convictions were fundamentally informed by her experiences;
she rejected out ofhand any idea that "thought and action can be separated" (1924, 198;
see also Mattson, xlii-Ii passim). Above all, Follett was interested in developing
theoretical concepts that comport with our real actions and experiences, and that could in
turn inform both theory and practices that would lead to creative solutions to the ethical
question of "what is best for all of us" (given that implementing those solutions cannot
rely on coercion nor on erasure of difference, which amount to the same thing) (see e.g.
1918,81,63, 163). Follett saw early on that the erroneous idea of individuals as radically
autonomous did not adequately reflect actual human experience, nor could it support the
robust theory needed to sustain fruitful human practices. To sum up, for Follett, "Non-
relation is death"; human life is interrelational, and human persons are constituted and
sustained via interdependent interrelations (ibid., 63).
Interdependence and Empowerment
When appropriately situated in a context of interdependency, Follett's conception
of "power-with," or "co-active" power as Follett later calls it (1942d, 101), encompasses
56
empowerment or what has been called the "power-to" as "the ability to make things
happen" (ibid., 99); that is, the power to act effectively while being free ofoppression
from and avoiding use of "power-over." This is because no ability to act can exist absent
or outside of interdependent interaction, and that ability to act via interdependent
interaction is enhanced by "power-with" and constrained by "power-over," whether the
actor is the one wielding the power over another or vice versa. Other theorists, including
some feminist theorists, have equated "power-to" with enhancing individual
independence in a context that relies at least in part on the concept of persons as radically
autonomous (see Coleman 2000, 110-111; Allen 34-35).11 This problematic theoretical
assumption confines empowerment to a binary logic: If "power-over" entails power
relations imposed and maintained by coercion and compromise (in Follett's sense of the
term, including for example social expectations to sacrifice one's self as discussed
below), then those with less "power-over" also have less "power to" and are dependent
on those who have more. Therefore, it is assumed that full-fledged empowerment as
freedom from "power-over" in order to enjoy "power-to" entails full individual
independence as radical autonomy. This assumption also entails relying on the
"balancing" theory of power that Follett rejects: in order for one person to be empowered,
another must give away or be forced to relinquish some of their own power. For example,
in the volume Mediation: Positive Conflict Management, mediators are informed that one
of their tasks "is to develop strategies to empower all the members of the family," and
advised that one strategy for doing so is "by disempowering one member of the family
who knowingly exercises power to the detriment of others" (Haynes 2004, 130; emphasis
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added). A similar problematic binary logic informs the individualist fallacy on which
current ADR practices generally rely. However, as Follett's theoretical work makes clear,
the opposite of dependence is not independence, but interdependence-and the opposite
of disempowerment is "power-to" not as "power-over," but as "power-with."
This full-blown version of Follett's theory as one that entails a fundamental
rejection of both strategies of domination (including any recourse to "balance of power")
and strategies of compromise is based not on the mere concepts of "power over" versus
"power with," but on a rejection of the individualist fallacy in favor of a theory of power
consistent with persons as interdependent. The resulting theory is a very useful resource
for reconstructing current mediation practices. To help see how this is so, 1 would like to
return here to Follett's discussion of the problems with compromise and extend the
analysis, keeping interdependence at the forefront. Recall that employing any significant
compromise-whether involving the voluntary submission of just one side, or of both or
all sides-in an effort to resolve differences is futile, as Follett asserts. This is because
compromise involves sacrifice rather than creative integration: "[S]elf-sacrifice has no
social value. No sound solution of [a] question depends on sacrifice" (1924, 170).12
Follett argues, "I must not subordinate myself [to others]. 1must affirm myself and give
my full positive value... a readiness to compromise must be no part of the individual's
attitude" in any undertaking that involves others (1918, 26).
Without the commitment from each party to a dispute that they will avoid
sacrificing their real interests and needs to benefit others or for expediency's sake, those
who are on other sides ofa dispute cannot have access to necessary information that will
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allow any agreements to address problems at their root and reach solutions that are
effective over time. The individual who compromises her own interests-whether
voluntarily or as a result of social pressure or other coercion-will suffer, as Follett
emphatically states, "Whoever advocates compromise abandons the individual: the
individual is to give up part of himself in order that some action may take place. The
integrity of the individual is preserved only through integration-and the similarity of
these words is not insignificant" (ibid., 163). However, so too will every other member of
the community or society in which that compromise takes place suffer. This inescapable
interdependence undergirds every aspect of Follett's theory on empowerment and dispute
resolution. There simply is no place for the notion ofpersons as radically autonomous
individuals who are imagined as being able to exist independent of their social situation
and attachments.
In cases ofostensibly voluntary one-sided submission, such sacrifice is usually
understood as a sacrifice ofone's situation for an abstract social good-such as by
resorting to an "emotional... [or] moralistic appeal of 'sacrificing' your individual
interests to the general good" (1924, 37). Follett's concern is not only to protect the
individual (or minority) from the coercion by others that even "voluntary" compromise
may entail, but also to protect others from the collective harm that results from individual
self-sacrifice:
Such people think that when they have reached an appreciation of the necessity of
compromise they have reached a high plane of social development; they conceive
themselves as nobly willing to sacrifice part of their desire, part of their idea, part
of their will, in order to secure the undoubted benefit of concerted action. But
compromise is still on the same plane as fighting. (Ibid.)
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At first glance, Follett's assertion here may seem at odds with other statements that
appear to advocate sacrificing one's self-interests for the good of others, such as this one:
"With our new social ideal there is going to be a far greater demand on our capacity for
sacrifice than ever before, but self-sacrifice now means for us self-fulfillment" (1918,
82). Yet there is no contradiction for Follett. In a context of interdependence, self-
sacrifice that results from a spirit of compromise does indeed promote disempowering
temporary "solutions" while prolonging conflict; however, the "unselfishness" that
inspires willingness to listen to other points of view while seeking creative mutual
solutions that avoid compromise-including solutions that may require giving up some
short term individual benefits for even greater benefits for both one's selfand others over
the longer term--can be empowering for all concerned (ibid.).
Follett's further practical concern is that sacrifice is almost always unnecessary.
Like her analysis of balance of power, there is an important temporal aspect here as well,
in that often over time what seem to be sacrifices prove not to be real sacrifices at all
(1924, 39-41). For example, Follett describes how it was difficult to enforce a law to
prevent pollution of a river in England so long as the main polluters-mill-owners in this
case-felt they were being asked to give up their short-term interests, even ifit was for
the common good. However, through additional discussion, these same mill-owners came
to realize how ensuring rivers remained unpolluted was also in their own greater long-
term interests; this realization, in turn, made effective enforcement of the law possible
(ibid., 38). In cases like these, the important feature is that those contemplating
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"sacrifice" have reasonable certainty that their long-term interests are well worth
whatever is being given up in the shorter term, and that both the long-term benefits and
short-term costs are not entirely abstract (e.g. neither merely for "the common good" nor
for "your future good" nor for "my future good"), but have a concrete dimension that can
be realized through embodied interdependent experience (e.g., cleaner river water for all
of us, as well as our children; see ibid., 41).
Follett's insights about the need to avoid self-sacrifice for the good of both the
individuals and the communities of all parties to a dispute are also useful for realizing the
ideal of empowerment in a context that not only prioritizes our interdependence, but also
recognizes the inescapable interrelationships between what have traditionally been
termed the public and private spheres. This provides a theoretical anchor for practices
that seek to avoid and redress social power imbalances that affect the relationships
between disputing parties, such as those based in gender or race. For example, because in
our society women often are expected and taught from an early age to defer to men-as
are people of color to whites-these disempowering "power-over" patterns will tend to
be replicated within the mediation setting even when mediators work hard to avoid this,
as feminist and other ADR critics have shown (Mayer 2004, 170-74; Clark 2005, 106-
7).13
Even when mediators work to prevent overt coercion of disputants who belong to
more socially powerful classes over those who are less socially powerful, if mediators
remain unaware of these patterns or do not have effective ways to assure they are
addressed and redressed within the mediation process so that all parties are in a position
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to avoid self-sacrifice, it is not just the individual disputants who are in the less powerful
social positions who will be harmed. All parties in the dispute and their communities also
will be negatively affected, as Follett demonstrates, because the best and most lasting
solutions to disputes can only come out of dispute resolution processes that recognize our
interdependence, and thus the importance that they be free of both coercion and
compromise. Because other forms of dispute resolution either involve some form of
domination, where a solution is imposed on the parties for their own or some other good,
or else prioritize settling disputes through various forms of compromise, mediators
should focus instead on practices that promote interdependent empowerment-what
Follett terms integration or "power-with"-as more efficacious.
A Re-analysis of Current Domestic Mediation Practice Using Follett's
Interdependent Theory of Empowerment
In order to help illustrate how a fully interdependent theory of empowerment such
as the one Mary Parker Follett provides us can serve as helpful resource in critiquing
current ADR practices, I would like to take this opportunity to reanalyze two somewhat
similar cases that Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger address in their 1994 book,
The Promise ofMediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and
Recognition-a book which remains highly influential in domestic mediation theory and
practice (see e.g. Coltri 2004, 320-21; Mayer 131-32). Bush and Folger are very
concerned about the negative impact of what they call "the individualist worldview" on
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the mediation profession; they share many of the concerns that have been addressed
above regarding the problematic notion of individuals as radically autonomous rather
than interdependent. Instead, they urge a more "relational" approach to mediation
practice that prioritizes recognizing and transforming the inter-relations between the
parties to a dispute, rather than bargaining aimed specifically at reaching a settlement
(1994,236-239 passim, 245-48 passim). However, their analysis also shows how
insidious the individualist fallacy is, because they end up reasserting the notion of
individuals as radically autonomous in order to criticize other approaches to mediation
that they believe are less relational than their own.
In one of the cases, which Bush and Folger present as an actual mediation
situation, a heterosexual married couple (who are either childless or whose children are
grown) has mutually decided to separate (1994, 214). However, the wife unilaterally
removed all the furniture from the home, claiming that the furniture was more important
to her than to her husband and was all she wanted in lieu of a financial settlement, even
though she was aware the furniture was worth only about one-sixth of their major asset,
the equity in their jointly-owned house. The husband apparently was willing to consider
other financial settlement options, but after discussion agreed to the wife's terms. The
mediator in this case insisted that he would assist the parties in writing up this settlement
agreement only after the wife had received further legal and financial advice.
The other somewhat similar case that Bush and Folger analyze is presented as a
role-playing scenario in the context of a training session on maintaining mediator
neutrality, at a conference for professional alternative dispute resolution practitioners
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(1994,34-35). In the scenario, the roles of the parties to the mediation again are a
heterosexual married couple, both of whom are well educated and hold good professional
jobs that pay well, who have two teenage sons. Their main shared assets are their equity
in their home and $40,000 in savings. The wife is the one seeking the divorce, and after
deliberation in prior mediation sessions, she is proposing that in exchange for a $30,000
lump sum financial settlement, she would forfeit any claim on the home equity or other
financial assets. Further, she believes it would be best ifher husband had full custody of
the sons, and that the wishes of the sons for visitation with their mother, if any, should be
followed. The wife says the main reasons behind her proposal were that her decision to
leave the marriage had caused considerable tension in the family, and it would be best for
everyone if the issues are resolved quickly so she could "get out." She also feels her sons
are closer to their male parent than to her, so at their ages it is best if they remain with
their father. The husband finds this settlement proposal acceptable. The scenario ends
with the mediator, who was represented as previously advising the parties to consult legal
and financial advisors, preparing to write up the settlement agreement.
Bush and Folger report that many of those attending the training session were
dismayed at the mediator's actions in the scenario. They felt that as portrayed in the role-
play, the mediator actually was not being "neutral," but had allowed the parties to agree
to an outcome that one or both of them would find unfair or unworkable over time.
(While Bush and Folger do not emphasize the ideal of neutrality in their approach, they
do advocate neutrality in the sense of the mediator working hard to empower the parties
to communicate with each other and to come up with their own solutions to their dispute
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if the mediation process gets to that point. Although helping the pmiies "test" whether
their agreement will be in each of their interests and workable over time is part of the
mediator's responsibility, they counsel that a mediator should avoid imposing her own
values or beliefs about what is best upon the parties.) The trainers then asked for
volunteers from the audience comprised largely of ADR professionals-although
presumably most audience members were not as experienced as the training session
leaders-to join the role-playas the mediators and went through the scenario again. This
time, the mediators challenged the parties more directly about their proposals regarding
finances and custody, including challenging the wife about her role and responsibilities as
a mother. In this alternate version of the role-playing scenario case, no settlement was
reached (Bush and Folger 1994, 35-36).
Bush and Folger's main analysis of both cases is similar: In the first case, by
insisting that the wife get additional legal and financial advice, they argue the mediator
acted in a way that "undermines empowerment" when he "deprived the wife of her
freedom to make her own decision" after she said she was ready to do so, even if that
decision would be a "mistake" (1994,214). Regarding the second case, Bush and Folger
adopt the same general approach, criticizing the audience for focusing too much on
whether the settlement agreement is "workable, stable, and equitable" as well as
adequately protecting the wife and children (ibid., 36):
The members of the role-play audience, in their rejection ofthe first enactment of
the case [by the seminar leaders] and their endorsement of the second [by
volunteers from the audience]. .. showed their relative unconcern for fostering
empowerment by supporting party decision making and control over outcome.
The audience considered the first mediator's moves as insufficiently concerned
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with the quality of the solution, although those moves were well suited to
preserving party determination. They treated the second mediators' moves as well
suited to achieving a quality solution, although those moves evinced little concern
for party control. In both reactions, the audience's concern for problem solving
and satisfaction was accompanied by a converse lack of concern for
empowerment and transformation. (Ibid., 40)
It is clear that Bush and Folger mean to defend an approach to mediation practice
that respects the need of the parties to relate to each other and the mediator in a way that
empowers them, and that does not resort to a paternalistic version of "'power-over."
However, their rejection of the individualist fallacy goes only as far as explicitly
recognizing the relations between the parties (and relations with the mediator) within the
mediation context, instead of acknowledging the full "inter-relationality" of the parties
not only with each other, but with their community and society both inside and beyond
the mediation context. Thus, Bush and Folger become stuck in the very trap of the
individualist fallacy that they seek to reject: the cure for paternalistically dependent
relationships is empowerment solely in telIDS of the radical independence of the
individual, rather than empowerment through recognition of our mutual interdependence.
This trap blinds Bush and Folger to the ways that recognition of interdependence
in mediation practice can be empowering for the individual parties to a dispute, rather
than merely serving as a symptom of a mediator's need to impose their own values or
prioritize settlement agreements over relations of the parties in the mediation process. I
believe most mediators who practice not just transformational mediation, but also what
Bush and Folger call more "directive" styles, do indeed hold the core value of
empowerment for clients, although they may not agree on how it is that clients are best
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empowered through mediation. I support Bush and Folger's insistence that the goal of a
settlement agreement should not be the overriding aim since that would work against a
voluntary process that successfully avoids resorting to "power-over" in the form of
compromise and self-sacrifice. However, their inability to move beyond the individualist
fallacy leads them to erroneously "assert that empowerment is 'independent of any
particular outcome of the mediation'" as Carrie Menke1-Meadow points out (2003b, 188).
That is, a mediation process or settlement that unintentionally serves to reinstantiate or
exacerbate existing power disparities between the parties by definition is not
empowering, as Bush and Folger explicitly acknowledge with regard to situations where
"one party is the victim of past violence by the other" (1994, 215). Yet, because of their
reliance on a notion of empowerment defined in terms of an abstract notion of persons as
radically autonomous individuals as the tie-breaker or trump in the mediation process in
order to avoid mediators being over-directive and paternalistic, Bush and Folger are
unable to fully extend their analysis to how socio-economic forces (beyond physical
violence between the parties) can allow the practice of mediation to become an agent for
coercive "power over."
Contrary to Bush and Folger, I believe the mediator in the first case they analyze,
and many of the audience members in the second case, in fact are concerned exactly with
empowerment of the affected parties in terms of interdependence (even though they may
not be prepared to articulate or evaluate their concerns in those terms). While I agree that
the way some of the audience members in the second case apparently challenged whether
the wife is meeting a (sexist) community or social test of what being a good mother
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means would be inappropriate in an actual mediation, it also is crucial for mediators to
recognize the wife's own beliefs (and the beliefs of the husband, children, friends,
relatives, neighbors, employers, pastors, divorce court judges, etc.) about this could be a
major disempowering influence in the mediation. In other words, I-and apparently
many other mediators-remain unpersuaded that it is "empowering" in Mary Parker
Follett's sense of "power with" for individuals who are inextricably embedded in their
communities and societies when mediators help facilitate agreements that have a
significant potential for contributing to the socio-economic disempowerment over time of
one or more directly affected parties. For example, such parties in the second case are the
wife (and possibly the children) in the longer run since in our culture she is likely to need
those assets to support her in old age even if she has a good job now, and probably the
husband and children in the shorter run since the wife apparently is not going to
contribute anything further to economically support the children or to future costs such as
college. Mediation agreements also are not "empowering" when they are based in large
part on social or economic discrimination against one or more parties. For instance, there
is a strong possibility in the second case that either the wife or the husband or both may
be feeling the wife needs to "atone" for not appropriately fulfilling her spousal and
maternal roles in a socially-sanctioned way by forgoing economic assets to which she
otherwise might have a strong claim. There is also the possibility that the parties are
responding to the economic coercion that a court might be inclined to punish the wife for
her transgression of social mores even more than may be reflected in the proposed
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settlement agreement, so the husband's offer is both generous and the best deal she is
likely to get in the circumstances (especially ifhe is not asking for child support).14
This re-analysis of these cases presented by Bush and Folger helps make clear
how insidious the individualist fallacy is in the practice of domestic mediation. This is
particularly so since one of its major symptoms is the hydra-headed conception of
empowerment as tied to each individual as radically autonomous, instead of promoting
interdependence that is based on "power with" rather than "power over"--even on the
part of mediation practitioners who are both conscious and critical of that individualist
fallacy. If Bush and Folger had theoretical resources such as full access to Follert's work
as a well-developed theory of interdependence, they likely would be able to recognize
just how disempowering it is when individuals are treated as if they were radically
autonomous during the mediation process. More importantly, beyond the specifics of
these cases, this reanalysis shows how Follert's work provides the critical resources the
mediation profession needs to understand why we are facing the current problems and the
nature of those problems, as well as the resources to help rectify those problems.
Summary
This chapter has provided an in-depth examination of feminist-pragmatist
philosopher Mary Parker Follert's work. I have shown why her work is particularly
important to reclaim in light of both the need to understand the challenges currently
facing the mediation profession, and the need to reform mediation practices to effectively
address those challenges: Follert' s work affords us the well-developed theory of power as
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empowerment, consistent with the idea that persons are interdependent and socially
embedded, that our profession has been lacking. In the next chapter, I tum to how the
application of such a well-developed theory of empowerment rooted in interdependence
can be used to reform mediation practices.
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Notes for Chapter III
1 Follett not only received inspiration from but also had disagreements with both Royce and
Hegel. For example, in a section on "Loyalty" in The New State, she asserts, "we do not love
[Royce's] Beloved Community because it is lovable-the same process which makes it lovable
produces our love for it. Moreover it is not enough to love the Beloved Community, we must find
out how to create it.. .Loyalty to a collective will which we have not created and of which we are,
therefore, not an integral part, is slavery" (1918, 59). And likewise, despite a spirited defense of
Hegel against "the misunderstood Hegelianism," she also defends "the real Hegel" against "the
Ht<gel who misapplied his own doctrine" (1918, 266, 267).
2 Jane Mansbridge points out that although Follett did not call herself a "feminist" (perhaps in
part because the term was not yet in widespread use), many of her theoretical insights "have
become a working part of feminist theory" (1998, xvii). Mansbridge provides a useful synopsis of
the direct link between Follett's feminist-pragmatist theoretical work and contemporary feminist
theory (see ibid., xvii-xxii).
3 Barrett also states that Follett was a Quaker (2004, 210). Although brief biographies of Follett
often assert her Quaker heritage, the source ofthat assertion is unclear (it is beyond the scope of
this project to delve into the primary research necessary to resolve this matter). However, in her
exhaustive biography of Mary Parker Follett, Joan C. Tonn reports that Follett's mother came
from a prominent Unitarian family in Boston, and Follett's parents were married in a Unitarian
church where her maternal grandfather "owned two pews" (2003, 12), which Follett's father had
joined. Tonn further reports that when Follett was about 8 years old, she began worshipping (and
was later rebaptized) at an Episcopal church when her father rejoined the same congregation to
which his own parents had belonged (ibid., 21-22). In any event, Tonn does not indicate that
Follett ever attended organized Quaker religious or educational institutions, nor that Follett
credited the Quaker tradition per se as having any significant direct influence on her theory or
practice, although Follett was influenced to some extent by the work ofprominent people who
were themselves of Quaker heritage, such as Jane Addams (ibid., 139).
4 See, for example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow (2003a, 8-12 passim).
5 For a contemporary overview of why mediation generally is considered to be preferable to other
dispute resolution processes, including other ADR processes, see Kovach 2005,305; and Mayer
2004,102-103. Also, see Follett's own detailed discussion on the advantages of mediation over
arbitration in "The Psychology of Conciliation and Arbitration" (1942f, 230-238 passim).
6 Follett extensively addresses the theory behind her formulation of "power-over" and "power-
with" in Creative Experience, particularly in the chapter on "Power" (1924, 179-194), and returns
to these ideas in her 1925 paper on "Power" (1942d). The issue of power and empowerment as
they relate to both problems with current domestic mediation practices, and possible solutions to
those problems, will be taken up in more detail below.
7 Extra-thorough and diligent readers will find the authors do mention that Follett is the source of
this account in the "Acknowledgements" section oftheir prefatory material (see Fisher and Ury
1981, vii; 1992, xii).
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8 Follett gives a similar account in Creative Experience (1924, 184-85).
9 The context for this comment is judges making court rulings, which could be interpreted as
"imposed," at least in a formal sense; however, Follett's point is that even the legal process (i.e.,
not an "alternative" dispute resolution process) can be used to find creative resolutions that do not
involve coercion or compromise. Here, she commends judges who have taken pains to listen to
the needs and desires of the claimants and to refrain from making any final ruling until a
resolution that satisfies both parties emerges. While there undoubtedly are some involuntary
aspects to this setting (e.g. one or both parties may have been compelled to appear), in the cases
Follett cites there do not appear to be grounds for defining either the process or the final ruling as
coercive or involving significant compromise-quite the contrary. (See Follett 1924,43-44.)
10 Note that the implications ofFollett's theory regarding the interrelation ofpublic and private
concerns do not eliminate privacy, any more than her rejection of the individualist fallacy
eliminates individuals (see e.g. 1918, 73).
11 Along with his own analysis, Edward W. Schwerin also provides a well-documented overview
of concepts of empowerment, power and disempowerment (or "powerlessness"), with particular
attention to their use in ADR theory and practice (1995, 55-81 passim). However, despite
extended analysis of the terms "power over" and "power with," he manages to omit any reference
to Follett-yet another telling example ofhow her theoretical contributions have been
appropriated without credit within the ADR field.
12 The specific context here is a trade conflict about wages, but Follett makes clear she means this
statement to apply broadly, beyond this specific issue (for example, see also 1924,50).
13 For an extended analysis of the effect of social power dynamics with regard to women, see
Women Don't Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide (Babcock and Laschever, 2003).
14 I would be remiss here if I did not point out that as an experienced mediator who is committed
to helping clients explore and create the best possible real-life resolution(s) for all those directly
affected (whether or not formal settlement is reached), what the main scenario in both these cases
strongly suggests to me is that these clients most likely are not confronting crucially important
aspects oftheir dispute. It is not unusual for clients to mention early on in a mediation that they
have already agreed on the main terms of a settlement. But I have learned this can be a red flag,
because why then are they proceeding with mediation at all? In both these cases, why did the
clients not just have the lawyers they consulted draw it up (or they could write it up and run it by
the lawyers, then wave in front of a mediator if that is required) and be done with it? I have found
the answer almost always is that their proposals are not nearly as mutually agreeable and pre-
settled as their opening statements would suggest. In these types of situations--even when great
pains are taken on the part of the mediator to avoid being directive-if an agreement is finally
reached it usually will end up being very different from the one initially presented. And many of
those differences will be analyzable in an interdependent context, in terms ofhow the original
"agreement" fell short for all parties because it was based on "power-over" in terms of coercion
or compromise, including the "voluntary" individual self-sacrifice that likely is operative in both
cases that Bush and Folger present.
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CHAPTER IV
REFORMING DOMESTIC MEDIATION PRACTICES:
TOWARDS CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTIONS
In light of my commitment both to feminist philosophy and to mediation as a
practice that generally is preferable to other ways of resolving disputes, such as through
fiat or threat of violence, before concluding this critique I would like to present several
constructive solutions in this chapter. These constructive solutions are aimed at
implementing reforms in domestic mediation practices based on the conception of power
and empowerment consistent with the idea that is central to feminist-pragmatist
philosopher Mary Parker Follett's theory, as explicated in the previous chapter, that
persons are interdependent and embedded in social communities rather than radically
autonomous.
If developed and adopted, these constructive solutions as well as others based on
Follett's alternative conception of power as empowerment rooted in interdependence
could help rectify the problems that the ADR profession, and particularly domestic
mediation, currently faces. Note that none of these constructive solutions are ex nihilo
creations. Instead, in each case they are based at least in part on the work of other
theorists and dispute resolution practitioners that I believe often has been overlooked or
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only partially implemented because the full value of that work is difficult to recognize
outside the context of empowe1111ent based on interdependence. Moreover, each of these
constructive solutions necessarily provides only a part ofthe answer to our challenges
and problems, and will need to be further refined as our profession continues to evolve in
ways that empower our clients.
Some Direct Applications of Mary Parker Follett's Theoretical Insights to Domestic
Mediation Practices
As discussed above, Mary Parker Follett's feminist-pragmatist theoretical
foundations for mediation point toward practices that emphasize inter-relationship (or
intra-relationship) rather than radical individual autonomy. Her work also emphasizes the
need for ongoing long-term solutions that take into account power and resource
disparities, since she convincingly shows that "solutions" that cover over such disparities
simply exchange uneasy short-term detente for exacerbated conflict later. Many of these
theoretical insights are incorporated into her ongoing legacy of industrial and
international dispute resolution practices. However, other than adopting the mantra
"power with, not power over," these insights largely have been overlooked in domestic
mediation (in part since most of her own professional experience was in those industrial
and international settings). Since Follett's work deserves further examination as a
potential resource for not only theory but also practical applications, I would like to take
this opportunity to present two recommendations about changes that could result from
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applying my reclamation of her theoretical work specifically to domestic mediation
practices.
First, reliance on the individualist fallacy has led to an artificial abstraction of the
role ofthe mediator as a facilitative leader who is radically independent and removed
from social or community attachments (other than certain limited ethical commitments to
our clients regarding fairness and efficacy of the mediation process), rather than
conceiving of ourselves in our role as mediators as thoroughly interdependent and
socially embedded. As Follett insists, our interdependence necessarily entails that
mediators, no less than any other persons, are "participant-observers" who cannot claim
to be outside or above or dispassionately involved in any situation-including the
mediations we lead. Rather, in those mediations we are inextricably co-implicated and
personally involved with the interpretation of the situation and with the other mediation
participants (see Follett 1924, xi-xii, 13,27).
Much of the current ADR literature on problems related to the ideal of the
impartiality and neutrality of the mediator role overlaps with Follett's work However,
that current literature tends to be narrowly focused on another important aspect, the
resulting harms to clients (e.g. Benjamin and Irving 1992, 131, 135-137; Coltri 2004,
414-417), rather than exploring how the potential is stunted for the mediator to take a
leadership role as an active yet noncoercive partner in helping to find creative solutions to
conflicts. As Follett explains, "We get power through effective relations. This
means ... beginning to conceive of the leader, not as the man in the group who is able to
assert his individual will and get others to follow him, but as the one who knows how to
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relate the different wills so they have a driving force." She adds, "the leader has not
always the largest share in the decision, and thereby he may not be any less the leader"
(l942c, 248, 257). The role of the mediator should be redefined from an impartial and
neutral one to that of a participant in the conflict who, as part of their leadership role,
brings one kind of useful specific expertise and helpful perspective to the situation.
Second, a more specific example of a change in mediation practices that could be
adopted is based on Follett's insistence on cooperative fact-finding in any processes
directed towards problem solving: "We must recognize ...that the facts on two sides of a
controversy are in part different, and will remain so except in those cases where the fact-
finding can be a joint activity" (1924,16; emphasis added). She adds, "It is true that even
if we could have a cooperative gathering of the facts we should still interpret them
differently, but the initial difficulty would be avoided-we should at any rate be looking
at the same facts. When the attention of each side is riveted on its facts, discussion
becomes rather hopeless" (ibid.). Mediators, as active participants in mediation processes
aimed at empowering clients, could assist those clients in working together to research
information that pertains to their dispute.
For example, rather than the usual practice in my experience of encouraging each
parent in a child custody dispute to find out for themselves what their rights and
responsibilities are as a "homework assignment" outside of the mediation session,
mediators could help the parents use internet search technology during the mediation
session to do that research. With appropriate assistance from the mediator, such
cooperative fact-finding could be an important resource that helps build trust between the
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parties and provides a solid joint basis on which to found creative solutions to the
conflict. In addition, incorporating cooperative fact-finding into mediation sessions helps
counteract any power disparities between the disputants based on differences in research
skills, access to accurate information sources, computer literacy, and so on. Further,
while tlns cooperative activity would take time during a particular mediation session, it
has the potential to save time over the entire course of the mediation process because
progress on addressing the dispute need not be delayed until "homework assignments"
are completed. In addition, arguments arising out of the mistrust of information provided
by the other party can be minimized.
Affording Access to Mediation Information in the Public Interest
Laws and ethical codes that regulate the profession of mediation, which are
currently based on the problematic assumptions (including theoretical assumptions) about
radical autonomy of individuals outlined above, need to be modified in order to allow and
encourage access to mediation information that is in the public interest. For example,
laws that require strict confidentiality ofmediation proceedings should be modified to
allow and encourage reporting of social pressures on individuals (names and identifying
details need not be attached) (see Menkel-Meadow 2004, 507-512passim). An additional
problem that needs addressing is that at present most mediation providers do not collect
or retain the types of information that would be most useful for addressing social
problems, even when it would be considered legal and ethical to do so. In consultation
with public interest researchers, mediation providers should change their protocols and
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procedures so that useful information from mediations is collected and retained. This
information should be in a format that both maintains the individual anonymity of clients
and enables ease of aggregation of that information to address social problems.
Train Mediators to Help Disputants Understand the Effects of Social Pressures
Beyond Their Control
Mediation training protocols should also be changed so that mediators are
prepared to help disputants explore and understand how social and institutional pressures
beyond their control have contributed to their dispute, and to take those pressures into
account when helping disputants create mutually acceptable agreements (see Scimecca
1993, passim; Schwerin 1995, 68-69, ). To return to the specific example discussed
above of disputes involving domestic partners who are working opposite shifts, the
training could involve teaching mediators about how this common and severe stressor can
negatively affect relationships, as well as how to present that information to the disputing
parties in a way that is likely to help them move beyond self-blame or blaming each
other.
However, since it is impractical to expect each mediator acquire sufficient
expertise to be effective regarding every type of social and institutional pressure that
might affect their clients, such training is likely to be most effective if it alerts mediators
to their general responsibility to their clients regarding these pressures. More common
stressors such as shift work could be used as examples during the training, and mediators
could be directed on how to access resources on the less common situations when the
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need arises in a particular mediation case. This could be combined with the addition of
specific questions during the intake process (i.e. the initial contact with the clients prior to
any mediation sessions [see Coltri 2004,361]) that are designed to elicit information on
the social and institutional pressures affecting a particular case. This would allow
mediators time to access applicable resources before the actual mediation sessions begin.
In addition, mediators could assist clients in cooperatively doing their own research on
these issues during the mediation sessions, as discussed above.
Resources From the Community Mediation Movement: Empowerment Through
Matching Cultural and Social Backgrounds of Clients and Mediators
Two different but somewhat related mediation models arising out of the
community mediation movement, developed by the Honolulu Neighborhood Mediation
Network (HNMN) and the San Francisco Community Board (SFCB), provide good
resources for a reconstruction of domestic mediation practices that is compatible with the
aim of empowering persons based on interdependence. Some of their practices already
have been adopted to some extent outside the community mediation movement, such as
the goal of matching the cultural community and social backgrounds of mediators with
those of the clients whenever possible. (So, for example, a dispute between people who
are African-American, a dispute between a gay couple, or a dispute between
fundamentalist Christians would be matched with mediators who are African-American,
gay, and fundamentalist Christian respectively.) When combined with the co-mediation
model discussed below, this practice can be adapted to situations where the disputants
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come from different backgrounds. (For example, if a dispute is between a client who is a
fundamentalist Christian and another who is an atheist, the goal would be that the co-
mediators would also include a fundamentalist Christian and an atheist.)
Granted this practice is necessarily constrained by many practical limitations,
such as the impracticality of closely matching all the significant cultural and social
dimensions for each client. Our backgrounds are not limited to just a particular religion or
ethnicity or gender or sexual orientation or occupation or economic circumstance;
instead, often each of our backgrounds includes all of these and more. Thus, careful
attention must be given to prioritizing matching the background of the mediator with
those one or two aspects of the backgrounds of each client that are most important to the
client in the context of the particular dispute that is to be addressed in the mediation.
In my experience, this is one way for mediation practices to recognize and honor
the importance of the communities that mediation clients belong to, and to help ensure
that clients feel their concerns will be recognized and taken seriously by mediators with
respect to their socially-embedded circumstances. For instance, I have worked with
several different fundamentalist Christian clients who each had the same basic concern.
Their concern was that a mediator who did not share their faith would not understand
how important it was for them to continue in a marriage despite serious marital conflicts
rather than consider the option of divorce, or how important it was for them to continue
homeschooling their children despite a severe lack of resources rather than consider the
option of a free secular education in the public schools. Although my background is not
fundamentalist Christian, I can understand their concerns since typically the process of
--------------- ..
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finding creative solutions to such disputes might well prioritize those very options that
they believe would compromise their most basic values and commitments to their
religious communities. As a mediator committed to the value of empowerment based on a
theory of interdependence, part of my responsibility is to assist my clients in avoiding the
need for such compromises (as Follett urges), rather than facilitating a coercive process
that is biased toward such compromises through my own assumptions about dominant
social norms. I will either need to be able to examine my own values and abilities in order
to be able to reassure my clients that I am able to help them explore workable solutions
that do not coerce them into compromising their basic values, or else recuse myself from
their case. This is not to deny that part of the mediator's responsibility is also to make
sure clients are aware of how those nonns may affect them. If a social norm regarding the
education of children has been codified as a legal requirement that all children below a
certain age must be enrolled in some type of school program, for example, in order to be
workable any creative resolution that is adopted will need to take such a norm into
account.
These examples from my experience also illustrate another benefit beyond
reassuring clients and providing some recognition during the mediation process of the
cultural and social communities in which they are embedded: The practice of matching
the backgrounds of the clients and the mediator can help ensure that the mediator is not
inadvertently facilitating the replication of social power disparities in the mediation
process, which the mediator may not be consciously aware of due to a different cultural
background or more privileged social situation. Further, a commitment to matching the
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backgrounds of mediators and clients helps avoid the all-to-common situation where the
pool of mediators available to a mediation provider has a velY different cultural and
social profile from that of the clients that provider typically serves. This often happens
when a provider that relies on volunteers fmds it is easiest to recruit and train highly-
educated middle-class white suburban residents, who have the resources to successfully
complete the training and follow through on with a volunteer commitment, when most of
its clients are inner-city residents of color who have not had access to good education or
jobs that pay a living wage. Mediation service providers who seek to empower their
clients should take responsibility for developing the resources necessary to recruit and
train a significant portion of mediators from the communities being served, and adopting
a policy of matching mediators with clients can help ensure that this responsibility is
prioritized.
However, the uncritical wholesale adoption of this practice of matching the
cultural and social backgrounds of mediators with that of clients may work against the
aim of empowering clients. This is because, as Follett warns, the access of disputants to
the difference and diversity that could be used to find creative solutions is limited (e.g.
see Follett 1918,24; 1924,300-301). A mediator who is from a different cultural
background and embedded in a different community can help bring a very different
perspective to the dispute and possible creative solutions.
In addition, the uncritical wholesale adoption of this practice of matching could
serve to perpetuate social power imbalances or inequities within the mediation process.
For example, if a husband and wife who share a traditional religious background are in
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mediation, that tradition may involve the wife deferring to the husband whenever a
significant disagreement arises. In such a situation, it could be particularly difficult for a
mediator who shared that same background to address gender-based power disparities.
Further, similar concerns may arise when each of the clients is from a different
background. For instance, it appears benign for a person of a particular ethnicity to
request or automatically be assigned a mediator who shares their ethnicity. But what if a
white anti-immigration citizen vigilante involved in a dispute with a Latino immigrant
who is not a citizen makes this same type of request, for example? Certainly both the
vigilante and the immigrant have good reason to believe that others-including
mediators-who do not share their particular backgrounds will not be able to understand
their situations, and thus will be unlikely to help them productively address their dispute.
It might seem advisable in such situations to fall back on a guideline that
mediation services will not be provided to disputants who openly advocate the
disempowerment of the other party to the dispute. Similar guidelines have been used to
deny spouses who are known to abuse their partners access to mediation services, and in
this case could be used to deny the vigilante mediation services. Yet almost always
denying services to one disputant is in effect denying services to all disputants. When
mediation is a better alternative than other ways of resolving disputes, denial of services
forces the disputants to seek other ways of dealing with their conflict that are less
empowering and more coercive.
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In sum, refining the practice of matching the backgrounds of mediators with
clients so that the benefits related to empowerment are enhanced and the detriments are
avoided is important work that should be continued.
Expand the Use of Co-Mediators and Mediation Panels
A minimal gesture towards changing mediation practices in a way that is
compatible with Follett's theory of empowerment based in interdependence has been
made by some mediation providers in the form of using co-mediators rather than single
mediators whenever possible. For example, in my experience this is the practice at the
Dispute Resolution Center of King County (WA). This practice is gaining more
widespread acceptance, and recent changes to "Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators" specifically acknowledge co-mediation as an accepted practice (ACR 2008a
cf. 2008b).
This practice should become the standard for domestic mediations, but more can
be done on this front in order to address the current challenges. Other practices that may
go further in applying the theory I am reclaiming here have not been seriously considered
outside a few very limited applications. These include the San Francisco Community
Board's community mediation panel approach, where three to five volunteers from the
community are trained to serve as mediators for a dispute, and some or all of the
mediation sessions are held publicly so any interested community members, may attend,
although not necessarily actively participate (Schwerin 1995, 24, 128; see also Coy and
Hedeen 2005, 248).
84
Incorporating Lessons from the Restorative Justice Movement: Involving the
Community
A related area that is ripe for reform has been raised by Lewis MeW-Madrona,
among others involved in the "restorative justice" movement. The restorative justice
approach emphasizes empowering all participants in a dispute as a better way than
"retributive justice," which is based primarily on punishment, to achieve justice and
maintain the integrity of relationships between individuals and their communities (see
e.g. Mehl-Madrona 2006,277,290,292-93). MeW-Madrona has discussed the need to
not just identify, but rather to explicitly involve and incorporate the "affected audience"
or "shareholders" into mediation processes (ibid., 296, 291, 292-93). The affected
audience is comprised of community members or others who may not be as directly and
actively engaged in a conflict as those who are deemed to be the primary participants in a
dispute resolution process, yet nevertheless have a significant stake in or are likely to be
significantly affected by the dispute or its outcome (ibid.; see also Coltri 2004, 9-10, 93-
100 passim, 132-33,205-206). As discussed above,] the reliance on the individualist
fallacy has led to a lack of accountability on the part of individual disputants and
mediators to others who are affected by ostensibly private disputes.
In my experience, a common example of members of the "affected audience" in
mediations involving child custody is grandparents who have close relationships with
their grandchildren and have been providing regular childcare for them; such
grandparents are defmitely affected when, for example, the outcome of a mediation is a
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child custody agreement that includes a provision for the grandchildren to spend summers
with a parent who will be moving a considerable distance away from where the children
and grandparents currently reside.
Possible changes to mediation practices that are consistent with Follett's
alternative conception of empowerment based on interdependence could include two
components. The conception could allow more people who are affected but not active
disputants into the "private" mediation space (such as inviting grandparents who have a
close relationship with their grandchildren to help parents find creative resolutions to
child custody issues, or directly involving court officers and social workers who may
hold "veto power" over custody arrangements into the mediation process). Second, the
conception could open up the mediation space so that it is more public (such as holding
some sessions of a mediation in front of community members who are concerned but not
directly involved so they can share concerns and provide input). Both of these approaches
are incorporated into some practices being developed in the "restorative justice" approach
to resolving disputes that involve teen offenses (see Auerbach 1983, 126-8; see also Zehr
1995) as well as disputes that involve family violence, particularly in the context of
indigenous communities. For example, Kay Pranis's outline of general guidelines for
restorative justice practices in family disputes involving violence includes the goals of
"involvement of the larger community in design and oversight of the [restorative]
process," and "involvement of persons outside the nuclear family who have close ties to
the family" provided they "disapprove of the violence" (2002, 32).
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Restorative justice practices may prove to be effective and applicable not just to
specific types of cases, such as those involving domestic violence, but also to domestic
mediation practices in genera1.2 Feminist legal scholar and indigenous studies professor
Larissa Behrendt cautions that some "staunch advocates of mediation" have "seemed to
forget that mediation may have been an alternative dispute resolution process but it was
not an alternative to the dominant legal system; it was only an extension of it." Instead,
she advises that "a better way is a ground-up approach, one that starts with the
community developing the process, not the process being adapted to the community"
(2002, 188). This advice can serve as a guiding maxim in reconstructing mediation
practices beyond those that relate strictly to process, a maxim that is compatible with the
insights from Mary Parker Follett about the nature of the leadership role of mediators
discussed above. For instance, a current model that is widespread involves professional
mediators traveling as individuals to dispute resolution centers or other mediation venues
to meet privately with clients, who themselves have also had to travel to the dispute
resolution centers, often from some distance away. We should consider the possibility of
redefining the model so professional mediators are trained to serve as mentor facilitators
who travel into communities as invited visitors in order to collaborate with community
leaders, who in tum directly assist disputants. This model would provide community
leaders access to a broader range of mediation resources and expertise than is generally
available in a given community. Also, and more impOliantly, those community leaders
would be afforded the opportunity, with access to expert assistance and support, to create
the mediation processes that will work best in their particular social context.
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Summary
In this chapter, I have presented a variety of constructive solutions that are aimed
at implementing reforms in domestic mediation practices based on the conception of
power and empowerment, consistent with the idea that is central to Mary Parker Follett's
theory as explicated in the previous chapter that persons are interdependent and
embedded in social communities rather than radically autonomous. I discussed how, if
developed and adopted, these constructive solutions as well as others based on Follett's
alternative conception of power as empowerment rooted in interdependence could help
rectify the problems that the ADR profession, particularly domestic mediation, currently
faces. In the next chapter, I briefly present my general conclusions from this critique.
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Notes for Chapter IV
1 The issue of additional stakeholders is discussed in subsection 4 of the first section of Chapter 2.
2 Although it is beyond the scope of this critique to provide a comprehensive overview of all the
practices of the restorative justice movement that may prove fruitful for broader incorporation
into mediation processes, in addition to Mehl-Madrona, Pranis, and Behrendt, the following
sources collected in the 2002 volume Restorative Justice and Family Violence edited by Heather
Strang and John Braithewaite can serve as excellent resources: Bazemore and Gordon, Blagg,
Coker, Morris, and Pennell and Burford; see also Spitz 2006.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
In this feminist philosophical critique, I have identified the main causes of the
current challenges the mediation profession as primarily resulting from an inability to
realize the aim of empowering mediation participants, due to the unwitting reliance in our
theory and practice on the mistaken idea that the human person is radically autonomous.
This has resulted in mediation practices that not only fail to empower participants, but
can actually be disempowering. Domestic mediation is particularly vulnerable to these
challenges, because the risks of disempowering participants are magnified in the
domestic context. Building in large part on the work of contemporary feminist theorists, I
have also shown that the requisite theoretical and practical resources are available to
address these challenges and remedy the resulting problems, and offer my reclamation of
the work of feminist-pragmatist philosopher Mary Parker Follett as a prime exemplar.
As a feminist philosopher and practicing mediator, I must reiterate my
commitment to mediation----even given the current challenges and problems-as a
practice that generally is preferable to other ways of resolving disputes, such as those that
use coercion or even violent use of "power-over." However, mediation theorists and
practitioners now have the responsibility for addressing these challenges and remedying
these problems so that our aim of empowering mediation participants can be more fully
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realized. Otherwise, we are failing to do our part towards finding the creative solutions to
answer that key ethical question of "what is best for all of us" (Follett 1918, 81). Given
that the theoretical resources such as those I have presented here indeed are available to
support constructive solutions, we have no excuse for not taking up the hard work of
reforming our profession informed by a new understanding of what is at stake.
Since mediation is and should continue to be a flexible and responsive practice
that can be adapted to meet the different needs of the diverse individuals and communities
we serve, we can expect that the constructive solutions we will need to create will be
many and varied. Yet as we pursue these varied solutions, we should keep the following
guideline based on the lessons of this feminist philosophical critique in the forefront of
our endeavors, especially with regard to domestic mediation theory and practice: As we
theorize and do research and engage directly with our clients in mediation, we have the
duty to interrogate our ideas and methods and practices to determine whether they rely on
the individualist fallacy, or whether they take into account how both we and our clients
are interdependent and embedded in social communities. Ifwe consistently focus our
efforts on developing and implementing theories and practices that affirmatively
acknowledge a conception of power consistent with interdependence, we will be better
able to realize our aim offully empowering our mediation clients and their--or rather,
our---eommunities.
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